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1 Introduction
We provide first-time evidence on the characteristics and drivers of discontinuous changes,
termed jumps, in option prices. We address four questions: Do jumps in option prices occur
(1) simultaneously across strikes and maturities?, (2) as a result of jumps in the underlying
asset market?, (3) as a result of news announcements?, and (4) as a result of shrinkages in
liquidity?
These research questions are motivated by financial theory and are important to both aca-
demics and practitioners for three reasons. First, options have emerged as an important asset
class and a number of studies examine their risk-return profile (Coval and Shumway, 2001;
Driessen and Maenhout, 2007; Broadie et al., 2009; Santa-Clara and Saretto, 2009). Second,
any option pricing model should generate the empirical characteristics of jumps to be consistent
with the data. This is of particular importance in the context of option pricing models built
to be consistent with the dynamics of market option prices (Jackwerth, 1999; Skiadopoulos,
2001). Third, the identification of option jump characteristics and determinants can shed light
on the way that option prices are being formed in real-time.
To study the fine structure and real-time determinants of jumps, we employ high-frequency
option quotes on the S&P 500 E-mini futures options trading in a nearly 24-hour limit order
book electronic market at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). We classify traded option
contracts into 18 strike and time-to-maturity categories and compute 10-minute option returns
for any given strike and maturity bucket. Then, we identify price jumps and their exact timings
using Lee and Mykland’s (2008) (LM, thereafter) jump detection test.
Next, we investigate the nature of detected option price jumps and their relation with three
classes of determinants. First, we study whether option price jumps stem from jumps in the
underlying asset’s price and/or its volatility. Option pricing theory states that the dynamics
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of option prices are dictated by the dynamics of the price and volatility of the underlying as-
set. Second, we examine whether the occurrence, as well as the content of news releases is
associated with jumps. The release of news is expected to trigger jumps in option prices via
two channels: heterogeneous beliefs (Shefrin, 2001; Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006; Friesen et al.,
2012) and market sentiment (Han, 2008; Lemmon and Ni, 2011). We employ a set of U.S.
scheduled macroeconomic news announcements, which are well monitored by academics and
practitioners.1 The investigation of the real-time relation between jumps and scheduled news
announcements is possible because our 24-hour dataset includes the times at which most sched-
uled U.S. macroeconomic news announcements are released. We also employ a comprehensive
list of unscheduled news announcements; existing studies have paid little attention to how
unscheduled news impacts asset prices. Third, we investigate whether the detected jumps in
option prices may be due to changes in the liquidity of the option market. Christoffersen et al.
(2018) find that option illiquidity predicts future option price increases.
We find that option prices jump. The probability of a jump occurring ranges from 0.22%
to 0.56% depending on the option strike and maturity. Jumps are found to be negative on
average, they are sizeable with an average size up to 63% of the option price, and they are
mostly idiosyncratic (i.e., option prices in one strike and maturity category tend to jump
independently from prices in other categories). This implies that the options market does
not behave homogeneously in terms of the discontinuous movements of its prices. This finding
is not surprising given that the S&P 500 E-mini futures options market is populated by traders
with different motives. Our finding also extends Sheikh and Ronn (1994), who provide evidence
on the heterogeneity of the put and call option raw returns rather than the jump price dynamics
trading in a limit order book market.
1We do not employ firm-specific announcements because the underlying asset in the employed options has
to do with the aggregate market. The aggregate market will be affected by firm-specific news only to the extent
that a firm has a dominant position in the market; there is no reason to expect that this is the case.
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We find that option price jumps are mostly unrelated to jumps in the underlying asset’s
price. These results complement the findings of Bakshi et al. (2000), who document that index
call (put) prices do not always move in the same (opposite) direction with the underlying index
and their dynamics differ across strikes and maturities. We document that 14% to 28% of the
identified jumps occur around scheduled macroeconomic news releases depending on the strike
and maturity. However, even though a fraction of jumps cluster around news announcements,
we find that market illiquidity rather than the news content drives jumps in option prices. We
also find that jumps unrelated to the release of scheduled news are also triggered by shrinking
market liquidity. The shrinkage of market liquidity is manifested by an increase in options
bid-ask spreads at the jump occurrence. These results are robust to the choice of the sample
period (non-crisis vs. crisis periods) and to the choice of the set of news releases (scheduled vs.
unscheduled news items).
Our findings on the relation between market liquidity and news-related jumps are consis-
tent with the existence of informed trading in option markets (Chan et al., 1995; Easley et al.,
1998; Chakravarty et al., 2004; Pan and Poteshman, 2006, and references therein).2 Option
traders quote wider bid-ask spreads and thus they decrease market liquidity just before the
macroeconomic news announcement to avoid trading with informed agents. This is consistent
with Handa et al. (2003), who show that bid-ask spreads are a function of information asym-
metry in a limit order book market. Moreover, our results extend the evidence in Erenburg and
Lasser (2009), who find that in a limit order book market, the bid-ask spreads of index-linked
securities increase around macroeconomic news releases.
We document that most of the news-related jumps are accompanied by zero trading vol-
2In the case of a dealers market, an increase in the option’s bid-ask spread can also be attributed to the
increase in inventory costs (Muravyev, 2016) and /or to the hedging costs of option market makers (Huh et al.,
2014). However, the option market under consideration is not a dealers market since quotes can be provided
by any type of investor; no information can be obtained on the type of investor who places orders.
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ume. This has two important implications. First, there are no informed option traders prior
to scheduled macroeconomic announcements in the sense that there is no leakage of private
information; if it were, then trading activity should take place prior to the announcement. This
is inline with Ederington and Lee (1995), who find that there is no information leakage prior
to scheduled news releases in the context of interest rate and foreign currency futures markets.
Interestingly, this finding is in contrast to the evidence that there is private information prior to
firm-specific announcements (Augustin et al., 2019 and references therein). Second, our finding
on the relation between jumps and volume sheds light on the type of information asymmetry
that traders are concerned about in option markets. Kim and Verrecchia (1994; 1997) define
two types of private information: private information that accrues to some investors due to
leakage of information prior to an announcement and information that accrues to investors
who are skilled in processing publicly announced information and thus effectively converting
it to private. This is consistent with Kandel and Pearson (1995), who provide evidence that
stock market participants interpret the same news release differently. Our findings suggest
that option traders increase bid-ask spreads because they may also interact with investors who
possess the latter type of private information.
We extend our analysis by considering S&P 500 index options that are actively traded on the
Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE). We find that jumps are idiosyncratic just as in the E-mini
options market. We also document that a fraction of the detected jumps is linked to scheduled
macroeconomic news announcements; in 6% to 27% of the cases, a news announcement triggers
a jump. Finally, we find that the option market illiquidity is not the key determinant of option
jumps in this market.
Our paper contributes to four related strands of the literature. First, a number of studies
find that a portion of jumps in asset prices are related to news announcements in the context
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of equities (Maheu and McCurdy, 2004; Rangel, 2011; Evans, 2011), bonds (Jiang et al., 2011),
stock index futures, bond futures, and exchange rates (Lahaye et al., 2011). Jiang et al. (2011)
and Boudt and Petitjean (2014) also find that changes in liquidity result in jumps in bond and
equity prices, respectively.
Second, there is an extensive literature on real-time option price formation (e.g., Vijh,
1990; George and Longstaff, 1993; Sheikh and Ronn, 1994; Chan et al., 1995; Berkman, 1996;
Chan et al., 2002; Chakravarty et al., 2004; Muravyev, 2016). However, these studies do not
distinguish between continuous and discontinuous option price movements and they also focus
on equity options. To the best of our knowledge, Taylor et al. (2013) is the only other study
that explores the presence of jumps in option markets using high-frequency option prices; they
consider options written on the FTSE 100. However, their scope differs from ours. They
investigate which option pricing model can generate the detected option jumps, whereas we
explore their economic sources.
Third, various studies examine the time evolution of the S&P 500 implied volatilities (Ski-
adopoulos et al., 1999; Gonçalves and Guidolin, 2006; Neumann and Skiadopoulos, 2013).
Again, these studies do not identify whether the observed changes in implied volatilities are
smooth or discontinuous. Finally, previous studies explore the effect of news announcements
on at-the-money equity options implied volatilities (Ederington and Lee, 1996; Fornari and
Mele, 2001), as well as the option-implied VIX (Bailey et al., 2014). However, these studies do
not investigate whether the impact of news releases creates discontinuities in option prices nor
do they examine the entire spectrum of traded options individually. Most importantly, they
explore the impact of news releases, whereas we take the reverse approach by detecting first
jumps, and then we check their sources in the vicinity of their occurrence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the E-mini
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S&P 500 dataset and the way we structure it for our analysis. In Section 3, we introduce and
apply Lee and Mykland’s (2008) test to identify jumps in option prices across different strike
and maturity categories. In Section 4, we investigate the determinants of option price jumps.
We discuss a number of robustness checks in Section 5 and in Section 6 we consider the case of
S&P 500 index options. We conclude and outline the implications of our research in Section 7.
2 Data
2.1 Option data
We obtain intraday data for S&P 500 E-mini futures options and the underlying futures (E-mini
hereafter) from CME DataMine spanning from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010. The
dataset includes the best bid and ask quotes time-stamped down to the second, the sizes quoted
at the best bid and ask prices, the trading volume, and the transaction prices. Both options
and futures contracts trade in a nearly 24-hour electronic market termed GLOBEX.3 The use
of this dataset is of utmost importance for the purposes of our study because it allows us to
identify any real-time association of detected jumps with the scheduled U.S. news releases. This
is because most scheduled macroeconomic news announcements in the U.S. are released at 8:30
a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) taking place outside of the trading hours of most organized
equity derivative exchanges. However, a real-time analysis is required as news announcement
effects have been found to be relatively short-lived [for a similar choice in the context of futures
markets, see, for example, Andersen et al. (2007)]. We sample quotes from 8.00 a.m. to 3.45
3"E-mini" contracts are sized at one-fifth of the value of the regular contracts, making them more accessible
to traders with small margin accounts. They trade almost continuously for five days a week on an open electronic
limit order book system (GLOBEX) that is accessible to off-floor traders, as well to a number of market makers.
GLOBEX is an international, automated order entry and matching system, which has a network extending to
10 financial centers, including New York, Chicago, London, and Tokyo. Trading on GLOBEX starts on Sundays
at 6:00 p.m. EST and ends on Fridays at 4:15 p.m. EST. On Mondays through Thursdays, trading stops at
4:15 p.m. EST and restarts at 4:30 p.m. EST. There is also a daily maintenance shutdown from 5:30 p.m. EST
to 6:00 p.m. EST on Mondays through Thursdays.
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p.m. EST to span the occurrence of scheduled news announcements.
Two more points are in order regarding the choice of the dataset. First, in line with Birru and
Figlewski (2012), we employ best bid and ask quotes rather than transaction prices because only
rarely do we observe simultaneous transaction prices for a large number of different contracts.
This problem becomes particularly pronounced for the further out-of-the-money options and for
options with longer maturities and it precludes us from performing our analysis on transaction
prices. On the other hand, the best option quotes are available at all points in time and are
continuously updated whenever the state of the order book changes. Moreover, we confirm
that our quotes are accompanied by a large size relative to the trading volume and hence, are
informative. Chan et al. (2002) find that option quotes can be more informative than trades.
We discuss this issue further in Section 3. Second, the chosen time period contains both the
mid 2007-2010 crisis period, as well as the previous non-crisis one. Therefore, we can check
whether the number, as well as the nature of jumps in the options market differs over turbulent
and non-turbulent periods.
CME offers two kinds of American style E-mini options, which differ by their expiration
months. Quarterly options expire in March, June, September, and December, whereas serial
options expire in January, February, and April. The underlying E-mini futures trade on quar-
terly expiries. Quarterly options are written on the E-mini that expire on the same day as
the option. Serial options are written on the futures contract that has a maturity nearest to
the option contract’s. We match intraday options quotes with the simultaneously recorded
underlying futures quotes and we discard observations for which this matching is not possible
to avoid problems arising from non-synchronous underlying and option quotes. We also dis-
card in-the-money option quotes because these options are highly illiquid [see Neumann and
Skiadopoulos (2013) for a similar approach].
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We apply a number of filters to the quotes of any given contract so as to minimize the impact
of microstructure noise, which is likely to contaminate the quotes data. In particular, we apply
the Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2009) filtering criteria commonly used in the market microstructure
literature. First, we replace bid and ask quotes with identical time stamps by their median bid
and ask quotes for this time stamp. Second, we discard quotes for which the bid-ask spread
is negative. Third, we discard quotes for which the bid-ask spread is “excessively” wide. We
remove a contract’s quotes whose spreads are greater than 50 times the daily median spread.4
We also discard quotes that are likely to represent outliers with respect to the midpoint quote.
To this end, at any point in time where there is a quote, we compute the difference between
the time t observation and the median midpoint of bid and ask quotes of the 25 observations
preceding and 25 observations following the time t observation. We then calculate the daily
mean of these differences. For any given day, we discard the observations that deviate by more
than 10 times from this daily mean.
Next, we group option contracts into buckets based on their strikes and maturities. This
classification serves two purposes. First, it provides a sufficient number of observations for each
strike and maturity; tracking prices for each option contract at high frequencies is not feasible
because not all strikes are traded. Second, it allows us to investigate whether the characteristics
of discontinuous option price movements differ across strikes and maturities. An “idiosyncratic”
4The choice of any filtering criterion involves a trade-off between the amount of noise and the valuable
information to be removed. Admittedly, in the market microstructure literature, the choice of threshold values
may be ad hoc when it comes to applying data filters. More stringent criteria may also be applied. For
instance, an alternative choice could be to first remove all contracts that correspond to zero option trading
volume during the day, and then apply the standard Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2009) filters to the quotes of the
remaining contracts; we would like to thank the referee for pointing this out. However, even the bid-ask quotes
corresponding to options with zero trading volume may contain useful information (Hiraki and Skiadopoulos,
2019). In addition, we group options into various categories depending on how close or far-away from the
money they are. The average option trading volume conditional on the occurrence of a jump is smaller for close
to-the-money rather than far-away from the money options (see Table 4). This provides further evidence that
the detected jumps are not driven by liquidity concerns once option liquidity is proxied by the option trading
volume. If trading volume is the driver of detected jumps, then the number of close-to-the-money option related
jumps should be higher compared to the one of away from-the-money options. However, we find that the reverse
holds in general (see Table 3).
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behavior of the discontinuous movements of option prices may be expected given that trading
different options serves different purposes, and hence they may enjoy a different clientèle across
the spectrum of strikes and maturities. Sheikh and Ronn (1994) and Bakshi et al. (2000)
document such an idiosyncratic pattern in the call and put option raw returns, yet without
isolating the jump component. In fact, the S&P 500 E-mini futures options market is currently
populated by off-floor traders, as well as by a number of market makers.5
We follow Bollen and Whaley (2004) and group option quotes according to their Black
(1976) deltas into deep out-of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money
(ATM) puts and calls; Panel A of Table 1 reports this classification [see Christoffersen et al.
(2018) for a similar approach]. The computation of option deltas requires estimates for the
risk-free rate, the underlying volatility, and the simultaneously recorded underlying price. We
assume risk-free rates to be constant through the trading day. We proxy them by the daily
U.S. LIBOR rates with maturities of one week, one month, two months, and up to 12 months
obtained from the website of the St. Louis Federal Reserve. Whenever rates with maturities
different from the ones covered by the data are required, we linearly interpolate between the
rates of the two available adjacent maturities. We use the Black (1976) model to back out
the implied volatility for each quote, and use it as the volatility input to calculate an option’s
delta.6 Option prices, as well as underlying prices are taken to be the mid-point of the bid and
ask quotes. In addition to the delta dimension, we also classify option quotes into short-term,
medium-term, and long-term options according to their time to expiration; Panel B of Table
5Currently, six market makers operate in this market: Citadel Derivatives Trading LLC, Chicago Trading
Company, Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., Goldman Sachs, Timber Hill, and Wolverine Trading LLC.
6Black’s (1976) model prices European style options. However, its use to calculate the deltas and implied
volatilities of the American style E-mini options is unlikely to introduce any error. This is because the early
exercise premium is negligible given that we use ATM and OTM options with time-to-maturity less than 100
days (Barone-Adesi and Whaley, 1987). Hence, there is no loss in accuracy from using the computationally less
expensive Black (1976) model. Using Black (1976)’s model does not assume that this model prices the options
accurately. The Black (1976) model merely serves to map option prices as a function of strikes space to option
prices as a function of deltas.
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1 reports this classification. The delta and maturity classifications yield 18 distinct groups of
option quotes, which provide a parsimonious and accurate description of the structure of traded
options.
For each one of these groups, we compute a time series of high-frequency returns, where
each return is measured over a period of length ∆t. To this end, we divide each trading day
into nd = Td∆t subsamples, where Td is the number of observations per day. Then, for each one
of these subsamples, we select the option quote with the delta closest to the midpoint delta
of the delta category under scrutiny. Based on this quote and the latest quote for the same
contract (i.e., same strike price and expiration date) before the end of the subsequent interval,
we compute the high-frequency log option return for the delta category under scrutiny. This
approach ensures that we compute option returns from the same contract. Then, we repeat
the same process over the following subintervals. The application of this procedure to each
subinterval and delta/maturity bucket yields a series of high-frequency option returns for all
18 delta/maturity categories.
The empirical implementation of this scheme requires a choice for the subinterval ∆t. In
our jump detection test we assume that ∆t is arbitrarily small. Hence, it is desirable to choose
the subinterval as short as possible. However, the more granular the sampling frequency, the
more the data are contaminated by microstructure noise, which can distort the subsequent
jump detection. Hence, in line with Andersen et al. (2000), we employ volatility signature
plots of high-frequency option returns to select the "optimal" subinterval length. Volatility
signature plots depict realized volatility as a function of the sampling frequency. In the absence
of microstructure noise, realized volatility, defined as the squared root of summed squared
intraday returns, should be invariant to changes in the sampling frequency provided the data is
sampled fine enough. Figure 1 shows the average daily realized volatility over our sample as a
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function of different subinterval lengths for the various delta levels for the short-term options.
Volatility signature plots for the other two maturity buckets are in the Online Appendix. We
can see that the realized volatilities diverge as the subinterval length approaches zero, and they
start converging around the 10-minute mark. Hence, we choose a subinterval length ∆t = 10
minutes. This choice yields between 52,627 to 64,755 return observations depending on the
delta-maturity bucket.
2.2 News announcement data
We consider a list of scheduled U.S. macroeconomic news announcements, which includes 11
news items. We obtain the exact timing of the releases and their corresponding survey forecasts
from Bloomberg. On Fridays, Bloomberg surveys key market participants for their forecasts
regarding the values of economic variables that will be released within the next week. The
median of the survey is taken to be the forecast for the respective economic variable. Table
2 reports the announcement items and their timing. All scheduled announcements take place
within our daily sampling interval from 8:00 a.m. EST to 3:45 p.m EST with most of them
being released at 8:30 a.m. EST on a monthly basis. The only exception is the FOMC rate
announcement on 8/10/2008, which occurred at 7:00 a.m. EST; we exclude this announcement
because it took place outside of our defined trading day. In total, our sample contains 888
announcements and 751 days on which at least one scheduled announcement was released.
Following Balduzzi et al. (2001), we consider news surprises to assess the impact of news
announcements on option markets; in an efficient market, prices should not respond to infor-
mation that has already been anticipated by market practitioners. Let Ai,t denote the ith news
item’s actual figure released at time t and let Fi,t denote the forecast for this figure. Then, the






where σi denotes the sample standard deviation of the surprise components Ai,t − Fi,t for the
ith news item. We standardize the news surprises to facilitate comparison across different news
items. As news surprises measure the component of a news release, which is unanticipated by
the market, we will also refer to them as information shocks below.
2.3 Liquidity measures
Market liquidity is defined as the ability to buy or sell significant quantities of securities quickly
at a low cost with little price impact. We compute two liquidity measures to proxy two impor-
tant dimensions of the definition of market liquidity: the bid-ask spread and the option sizes
ordered at the bid and ask prices. The bid-ask spread measures the cost of executing a trade
for a given size, whereas the size variable measures the depth of the market (i.e., how many
contracts are offered) at the best bid and ask price.






where Askt (Bidt) denotes the bid (ask) quote of the contract used to compute the 10-minute
option returns and σ(BA), the sample standard deviation of the dollar bid-ask spread BA of
the respective delta and maturity category. We compute a standardized bid-ask spread because
the bid-ask magnitude depends on the option’s strike and maturity.
Second, we obtain the time t quoted sizes (AskSizet) and (BidSizet) at the best ask and
bid quotes, respectively, for each delta/maturity category. To this end, we retain separately
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the ask and bid sizes of each one of the quotes used to compute the 10-minute option returns.
3 Jumps in option prices
3.1 Jump test
We employ Lee and Mykland’s (LM, 2008) jump detection test to test whether there are any
jumps in option prices. Compared to competing approaches, the LM test has the advantage
that it detects both the occurrence and the timing of jumps [see Dumitru and Urga (2012) for
a review of jump detection tests]. It does so by checking each recorded change in the asset
price to determine whether or not this is a jump. It relies on the idea that large movements
in an asset price can either be caused by jumps or they could be realizations of a continuous
yet highly volatile process. Hence, it adjusts the observed movements by the volatility of the
continuous part of the stochastic price process. If a given adjusted movement is "too large",
then this change is labeled a jump.
Let S(t) denote the time t asset price. In the absence of jumps, the stochastic evolution of
S(t) is represented by:
d logS(t) = µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW (t), (3)
whereW (t) is a Brownian motion. µ(t) and σ(t) are the drift and volatility stochastic processes,
respectively, such that d logS(t) is an Itô process with continuous sample paths. In contrast,
if jumps are present, S(t) is assumed to follow:
d logS(t) = µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW (t) + Y (t)dJ(t), (4)
where J(t) denotes a counting process that controls the arrival of jumps and Y (t) denotes the
14
jump size.
Assume there are n (equidistant) observations of S(t) available and t ∈ [0, T ], where T
denotes the total number of observations of any given time series of option returns. Then, the
distance between observations ∆t is given by ∆t = T
n
. We test whether there is a jump at
a particular time ti ∈ [0, T ]. The LM test standardizes the log-return from ti−1 to ti by the
instantaneous volatility of the stochastic price process to account for its diffusive component.
Thus, the LM test statistic is:
L(i) ≡ logS(ti)− logS(ti−1)
σ̂(ti)
, (5)
where σ̂(ti) is estimated by the realized bipower variation (RBPV) using the pastK observations







|logS(tj)− logS(tj−1)]| |log [S(tj−1)]− log [S(tj−2)]| . (6)
RBPV estimates the instantaneous volatility consistently even in the presence of jumps in the
past K observations. LM show that under the null of no jumps and as ∆t→ 0, the distribution
of L(i) approximately follows the distribution of a normally distributed random variable with






π. In contrast, LM show that in the presence of jumps
as ∆t→ 0, L(i) becomes very large. Hence, observing large values of the test statistic inidicates
the presence of jumps.
To assess how big the test statistic must be to indicate the presence of a jump at a certain
significance level, LM employ the distribution of the maximum of the test statistic over L(i)
under the null of no jumps. If the test statistic is greater than its maximum under the null of
no jumps, it is highly unlikely that the observation in question was generated by a continuous
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, Sn = 1c(2 log(n))1/2 , and n is the sample size. The null
hypothesis of no jumps is rejected whenever |L(i)|−Cn
Sn
exceeds the critical value β∗ obtained from
a standard Gumbel cumulative distribution for a given confidence level α with β∗ such that
exp(− exp−β∗) = 1− α, i.e., β∗ = − log(− log(1− α)).
To implement the LM test, one has to select a window size K for the purpose of estimating
instantaneous volatility. In line with LM, we choose K to be the smallest integer in the interval
between
√
252× nobs and 252×nobs, where nobs denotes the number of observations per day.
We determine the critical values by setting the Gumbel cumulative distribution function to a
confidence level α = 0.1%. We choose such a conservative significance level to minimize the
number of spuriously detected jumps; under the null hypothesis that there is no jump in any
given subinterval, we expect to find a spuriously detected number of jumps equal to the number
of observations times the chosen significance level.7
3.2 Results
We separately apply the LM test to the time series of the futures returns, and the option
returns across the various delta and maturity categories. Table 3 reports the summary statistics
(number of jumps, probability of a jump to occur, number of jump days, probability of a jump
day to occur, average jump size, and percentage of negative jumps as a fraction of total jumps)
7We checked the robustness of the results with respect to changes in the significance level. We find that the
results are qualitatively the same for different choices of the significance level ranging from 0.1% to 10%.
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for each one of the delta and maturity categories.8 It also reports the same summary statistics
for the underlying futures.
In Table 3, we can see that option prices jump. The number of jumps varies substantially
across the delta and maturity buckets. With respect to the delta dimension, the DOTM calls
and puts exhibit the greatest number of price jumps. With respect to the options maturity
dimension, short maturity options exhibit more jumps than the longer maturity ones for all
delta levels but OTM and DOTM calls. The documented heterogeneity of option jumps across
moneyness and maturities is consistent with the fact that a number of traders with different
motives trade in this market. Regarding the option’s price jump size, this is negative on average
and large (e.g., up to a 63% jump) with short-term options exhibiting substantially larger jump
sizes than longer-term ones. The findings also suggest that downward option price jumps occur
more often than upward jumps for almost all moneyness levels and maturities. Exact binomial
tests reveal that the probability of observing a negative jump is significantly greater than 50%
at the 5% significance level for most delta and maturity categories.
Finally, we compare the number of identified jumps in the price of the underlying asset to
the number of identified option price jumps. We can see that the number of identified jumps in
the underlying’s price remains fairly constant across maturities; this is in contrast to the option
price jump case. Furthermore, in most cases, the number of underlying jumps is less than the
number of option price jumps. This finding has implications with respect to the question of
how jumps are transmitted to option prices. It indicates that option price jumps cannot be
solely attributed to simultaneous jumps in the price of the underlying asset. We investigate
this relation further in the next section.
8Jump sizes are defined to be the realized returns that have been identified as a jump. Note that strictly
defined, these returns are the sum of the drift, diffusive, and jump component. Measuring the exact jump size
would require disentangling the drift and diffusive component from the realized return. This is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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Two remarks are in order at this point regarding the credibility of our results. First, the
employed best bid and ask quotes are reliable because they are associated with much larger sizes
than the typical trading volume. Table 4 provides evidence for this. It shows the unconditional
average size available at the best bid and ask price, as well as conditional on detecting a jump
for the short-, medium-, and long-term options (Panels A, B, and C, respectively). Additionally,
the average trading volume per 10-minute interval is reported. On average, the best bid and
ask sizes are much greater than the typical 10-minute trading volume. Therefore, the bid and
ask quotes are on average able to accommodate the typical 10-minute trading activity. Second,
the LM statistic is a conservative test in the sense that it captures large jumps. This is ensured
by the construction of the test statistic, as well as by the low significance level we employ.
Therefore, detected jumps are unlikely to be a manifestation of noise.
4 Drivers of option price jumps
4.1 Jumps in the underlying factors
According to pricing theory, option prices are determined by the price of the underlying asset
and its volatility by a no-arbitrage argument. In this subsection, we explore whether the
detected jumps in option prices are due to jumps in the price of the underlying asset and/or
its volatility. We define co-jumps (or simultaneous jumps) as the jumps which occur within the
same 10-minute interval. If jumps in option prices arise from jumps in the underlying asset price
and volatility, then one would expect these underlying factors to jump simultaneously with the
prices of the ATM options (co-jumps); ATM options have the greatest (absolute) deltas and
vegas. In addition, co-jumps across strikes may be observed. In the case where the underlying
and or volatility co-jumps with DOTM options, options closer to at-the-money should jump as
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well because their deltas and vegas are greater than the DOTM options’ ones.
To identify whether option prices co-jump, Figure 2 reports the frequency of different
co-jump events for the short-, medium-, and long-term maturity buckets (Panels A, B, and
C, respectively). A co-jump event is characterized by the number of concurrent jumps (i.e.,
jumps within the same 10-minute interval) across option prices of different delta levels and the
underlying price. The panels depict for each maturity bucket how often option prices of one,
two, three,..., six delta categories and/or the underlying price have jumped simultaneously. In
particular, the case where the number of concurrent jumps is one refers to an idiosyncratic
option price jump in one of the delta categories or in the underlying price. We can see that co-
jumps are rare. The vast majority of option price jumps are not accompanied by simultaneous
jumps in the option prices of other delta buckets or by a simultaneous jump in the underlying
price.9
Yet, the mere evidence that most option price jumps are idiosyncratic across delta categieries
does not rule out the possibility that some of the detected option price co-jumps are still due to
price and/or volatility jumps. For instance, a jump in the underlying price may yield a jump in
the ATM option price but not necessarily a jump in OTM and DOTM option prices. Similarly,
cases where only ATM call and put prices jump simultaneously might be attributed to volatility
jumps as these delta categories are more sensitive to changes in volatility than OTM/DOTM
option prices. To investigate this further, we examine which option prices of delta categories
and/or the underlying price jump simultaneously (termed composition of co-jump events).
Figure 3 shows the composition of co-jumps for the short-, medium-, and long-term maturi-
9We have also broadened the definition of co-jumps in two ways. First, we consider 10-minute intervals
adjacent to the detected jump. Focusing on each maturity and delta bucket separately, we calculate the number
of jumps that the remaining categories exhibit 10 minutes before, simultaneously, and 10 minutes after we detect
a jump in the bucket under consideration. We confirm that the detected jumps are predominantly idiosyncratic.
In the vast majority of the cases when we detect a jump in a specific bucket at time t = 0, we do not detect
any jumps 10 minutes before (t = −10), simultaneously (t = 0) or 10 minutes after (t = +10) in the remaining
categories. This corroborates further that the detected jumps are predominantly idiosyncratic. These results
are reported and discussed in the Online Appendix.
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ties (Panels A, B, and C, respectively). We can see that the already small number of detected
co-jumps is spread across various delta and delta/underlying combinations; they do not show
up in the ITM options and underlying category or in the ATM put and call options, which
would be evidence for options co-jumping with the underlying factors. In addition, there is no
specific pattern of the composition of co-jumps across maturities. Therefore, co-jumps do not
cluster in a particular combination of delta categories.
To sum up, our findings suggest that option price jumps are not due to jumps in the
underlying price and its volatility. Moreover, the presence of idiosyncratic jumps in option prices
implies that there is not a common factor that explains the variability of the cross-section of
jump-induced option returns. This is not at odds with studies that find that there are common
factors in the cross-section of total (defined to be the sum of diffusive and discontinuous) option
returns (e.g., Christoffersen et al., 2018).
4.2 Information events as drivers of option price jumps
We explore further the drivers of jumps in option prices. From a theoretical perspective,
news announcements can make option prices jump. This is because heterogeneous beliefs
(Shefrin, 2001; Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006; Friesen et al., 2012) and market sentiment (Han,
2008; Lemmon and Ni, 2011) are related to the slope of the implied volatility curve.10 Given
that certain news may affect these factors drastically, one might expect these news effects to
be transmitted to the slope of the implied volatility skew in a jump-like fashion. This will
be manifested as jumps in option prices. Motivated by these considerations, we investigate
whether jumps in option prices can also be related to macroeconomic news announcements.
To investigate to what extent detected option price jumps are related to scheduled macroe-
10At any given point in time and for any given option expiry, the implied volatility curve is defined to be the
relation between the options implied volatilities and their respective strikes.
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conomic news announcements, we match the detected jumps with the the release of scheduled
news announcements events (see Table 2). Here, an identified jump is related to a specific news
announcement if the jump occurred within ±10 minutes of the respective announcement.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the conditional probabilities P (News|Jump) and P (Jump|News)
to detect the relation between the detected jumps and all considered macroeconomic news.
P (News|Jump) shows the fraction of detected jumps associated with news announcements.
P (Jump|News) shows the fraction of news associated with jumps (i.e., it denotes the proba-
bility that a news announcement triggers a jump).
Regarding P (News|Jump), we can see that 14.35% to 28.50% of detected jumps are linked
to the scheduled release of macroeconomic news depending on the delta and maturity category.
The number of news-related jumps in the underlying asset differs substantially from the options
ones. This indicates that the previously documented segmentation of option and underlying
price jumps prevails around scheduled news announcements as well. Regarding P (Jump|News),
the probability of news announcements yielding jumps is greater for DOTM calls and puts and
it is greatest for short-term options; P (Jump|News) ranges from 1.35% to 6.86%. Hence, it is
more probable that a news announcement will yield an option price jump for shorter than for
longer term options.
To provide more insight on the relative importance of the 11 individual news items shown
in Table 2, we report the probabilities P (News|Jump) and P (Jump|News) for each news item
separately in Table 5, Panels B and C, respectively. Regarding P (News|Jump), the nonfarm
payrolls (NFP) report and the initial jobless claims (IJC) are associated with detected jumps
more than the other releases. In particular, the NFP report is associated with up to 14.13% of
the detected jumps, whereas IJC is associated up to 11.51% of the detected option price jumps.
Regarding the probability P (Jump|News) that a specific news release will trigger a jump,
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we can see that the NFP report is the news item that is most likely to trigger an option price
jump, among all individual news items. For certain delta categories of short-term options, a
NFP release results in a jump in more than 20% of all cases. This is in line with the literature
on jumps and news announcements effects in financial markets that documents that the NFP
report is the most influential scheduled news announcement (e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev,
1998). Interestingly, P (Jump|News) is masked when news announcements are aggregated; it
increases from 1.4% to 7% when all news items are considered jointly to 20% when NFP is
considered in isolation.
4.3 Information shocks as sources of option price jumps
Up to now our findings suggest that a fraction of option price jumps is triggered by news
announcements. However, one may hypothesize that not only the fact that new information is
released but also the content of the released information itself explains the occurrence of jumps.
We examine this hypothesis by statistically linking the occurrence of detected option price
jumps to the content of the released scheduled macroeconomic news. To this end, we employ
a logistic regression methodology [see Jiang et al. (2011) for a similar approach]. Lee (2012)
shows that this approach allows drawing inference on the determinants of the unobservable
stochastic jump intensity of the continuous time jump process even when one employs discrete







where j ∈ {NFP,CCI,CPI,DGO,FOMC,GDP, IJC,LI,NHS,PPI,RSA} and
P (Jumpt|News) denotes the probability that an option price jump will occur conditional on
a scheduled macroeconomic announcement taking place; ex post it takes a value of 1 when
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there is a jump at the announcement time t, and 0 otherwise. This conditioning is necessary
because the values of the macroeconomic surprises variables are only available at announcement
times, which implies that equation (8) can only be estimated for observations coincident with
announcement times. Therefore, a logistic regression unconditional on any news event cannot
be conducted.
A few remarks are in order at this point regarding the estimation of equation (8). For any
given delta and maturity category, the number of option price jumps that can be linked to the
concurrent release of scheduled news is too small to estimate equation (8) accurately for each
delta/maturity category separately. To increase the statistical accuracy of our estimates, we
pool observations across different delta levels and estimate equation (8) once for each maturity
category. We also only incorporate announcement items that exhibit at least one non-zero
surprise matched with a concurrent option price jump. Pooling across different delta categories
is not expected to affect our results for two reasons. First, the results of the analysis in Table
5 do not reveal any major differences across deltas with respect to the question of which news
items are most important in explaining option price jumps. Second, we use absolute surprises
and a binary jump indicator variable so that the expected sign of the θj is the same (positive)
for all delta categories.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the estimation results for equation (8). In line with the evidence
in Table 5, NFP surprises have a significant positive impact on the probability of a jump
occuring in short- and medium-term options. There is no significant effect of NFP on the
probability of a jump occurring in long-term options. For these options instead, GDP as well
as retail sales less auto surprises have a positive impact on the jump probability. However,
in general the evidence for a strong relation between news surprises and option price jumps
appears to be rather weak; only a small number of coefficients in Panel A are significant. The
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results from the logistic regression approach suggest that the triggering of option price jumps
by the considered news announcements is not due to the news content (i.e., due to the fact
that new information is being impounded into prices). This implies that option price jumps
are primarily driven by other determinants. We explore this further in the next subsection.
4.4 Illiquidity as a driver of option price jumps
As a final source of option price jumps, we investigate any effect of illiquidity on the associations
between jumps and news releases. Christoffersen et al. (2018) find that option illiquidity reduces
current option prices and predicts future option price increases. Hence, rapid movements in
option liquidity might result in jumps in option prices.
First, we examine the effect of changes of liquidity on the probability of news-related option
jumps. We re-estimate equation (8) by augmenting the set of covariates by the relative bid-ask










where ILk,t−1 denotes the time t − 1 value of the kth liquidity variable. We do not include
variables related to the liquidity of the underlying futures market in equation (9). This is
because the previous analysis showed that jumps in the option market are not related to jumps
in the underlying market.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the estimation results for the model shown in equation (9).
We can see that the coefficients of the standardized bid-ask spread are positive and highly
significant for all maturity categories. The coefficients of the bid and ask sizes are negative,
yet they are significant only sporadically. These results show that option price jumps are
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triggered by option market liquidity dry ups. Most importantly, almost all news surprise
variables become insignificant after adding the liquidity variables to the model. Hence, after
controlling for liquidity in the option market, the content of the considered news announcements
has almost no power in explaining option price jumps. Similarly, Jiang et al. (2011) and Boudt
and Petitjean (2014) find that illiquidity predicts jumps in bond and equity prices beyond
information shocks induced by macroeconomic news announcements.
Our findings suggest that it is liquidity and not the content of the news surprises that drives
the occurrence of option price jumps around announcements. To confirm this visually, for each





where Askt (Bidt) denotes the bid (ask) quote of the contract used to compute the 10-minute
option returns. We compute a relative bid-ask spread because the bid-ask magnitude depends
on the option’s strike and maturity [see Christoffersen et al. (2018) for a similar choice]. Figure
4 shows the median relative bid-ask spreads for a number of time subintervals around the
news-related jumps (10 minutes before the jump up to 60 minutes after the jump) across the
various moneyness levels for the case of the short maturity options. We can see that the
spread increases significantly on the jump time (point zero in the graph) in the case of the
short maturity options; the pattern is similar for the other two maturity buckets and it is not
reported to conserve space.
The fact that the bid-ask spread increases on the announcement day can be explained by
considering asymmetric information among traders as a key determinant of quoted bid-ask
spreads in limit order book markets (Handa et al., 2003). Option traders widen the quoted
bid-ask spreads and thus, they decrease market liquidity just before the news announcement
25
to avoid the risk of trading with traders with superior information about the upcoming infor-
mation event. This practice extends the evidence from index-linked limit order book markets
(Erenburg and Lasser, 2009) and it is highly relevant to options markets because these are
commonly viewed as a natural setting for informed traders (Chan et al., 1995; Easley et al.,
1998; Chakravarty et al., 2004; Pan and Poteshman, 2006, and references therein).
To provide insight on the above information asymmetry explanation for the link between
news-related jumps and liquidity, we investigate the nature of the information asymmetry. In
the terminology of Kim and Verrecchia (1997), information asymmetry can be either "pre-
announcement" and / or "event-period" private information. The former stems from some
information leakage that is not available to all traders. The latter type of information asym-
metry stems from the fact that some traders have better skills in processing information when
this is announced publicly, thus effectively making it private information (Kim and Verrecchia,
1994). In the case where there is no pre-announcement asymmetric information, there should
be no relation between trading volume and price changes.
In Figure 5, we plot the distribution of traded volume on the jump time, as well as 10
minutes before the jump, to check whether option jumps are driven by pre-announcement
private information. The figure shows the frequency (in %) distribution of the option volume
for any given delta bucket for the short-term options. We consider the percentage frequency for
three volume buckets of zero, 10, and more than 10 contracts. Similar plots for medium- and
long-term options are in the Online Appendix. We can see that the vast majority of news-related
jumps is accompanied by zero volume. This indicates that there is no private information due to
information leakage prior to scheduled news announcements [see Ederington and Lee (1995) for
similar evidence]; if it were, then trading activity should take place prior to the announcement.
Instead, traders increase their bid-ask spreads in the fear that they will interact with investors
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who are better skilled in processing information once the announcement is released; the increase
in bid-ask spreads arises due to order cancellation or bid-ask spread revision.11
We confirm the absence of pre-announcement private information in the case of news-related







k=1 γkILk,t−1 − βV olt−1,t)
, (11)
where V olt−1,t denotes the total trading volume in the respective delta/maturity bucket from
time t − 1 to t. Panel A of Table 7 reports the estimation results for the model shown in
equation (11). We can see that the option trading volume variable is insignificant, as expected.
This confirms that the observed increase in the bid-ask spreads of options is not due to pre-
announcement private information.
To robustify the evidence on the link between illiquidity and option price jumps, we explore
the determinants of option price jumps that are not related to scheduled news announcement
times. We estimate the following logistic regression based on a pooled (across delta categories)
sample of non-news related observations:




k=1 γkILk,t−1 − βV olt−1,t)
. (12)
Panel B of Table 7 reports the estimation results. We can see that non-news related jumps are
strongly related to increases in illiquidity in option markets. This result holds for all liquidity
measures considered. Our findings suggest that option market illiquidity is by far the most
important driver of option price jumps. Interestingly, the option trading volume is significant
11The information asymmetry explanation for the detected jumps cannot not explain on its own the docu-
mented non-synchronous occurrence of jumps across strikes. This is because an informed trader may choose
which strike to trade by taking other factors into account such as leverage, transaction costs, commissions etc.
(Chakravarty et al., 2004, and references therein). The relative importance of these factors may also change
through time, thus also partially explaining the idiosyncraticity of the detected jumps.
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now. The significance of the liquidity and volume variables reveals an explanation for the
occurrence of the no-news related jumps. In this case, the increase in bid-ask spreads cannot
be attributed to an information asymmetry story due to the nature of detected jumps. Instead,
it is attributed to the fact that the increase in trading activity fills in orders and as a result the
bid-ask quotes that are further down in the order book advance to the top of the order book.
5 Further robustness analysis
We provide further robustness tests. First, we conduct a subsample analysis. Second, we
consider the relation of detected jumps with unscheduled news announcements. Third, we use
a different index options dataset, namely data on S&P cash-settled index options.
5.1 Subsample analysis
We investigate the existence of option price jumps over two subsamples. We divide the entire
sample period from May 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010 into a non-crisis and a crisis period
spanning May 1, 2005 to July 31, 2007 and August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2010, respectively;
August 2007 is typically considered to mark the beginning of the global financial crisis. We then
recompute the jump and jump-news statistics as in Table 5, separately, for both the non-crisis
and crisis subsamples.
Panels A and B of Table 8 report summary statistics for the detected option price jumps
for the non-crisis and crisis periods, respectively. We can see that the jump frequencies in both
subsamples are of similar magnitude, for any given maturity category. Hence, jumps in option
prices exist regardless of the general market conditions, contradicting conventional perception
that jumps mainly occur during crisis periods.
Panels A and B of Table 9 report the summary statistics on the relation between jumps
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and all scheduled macroeconomic news announcements for the non-crisis and the crisis periods,
respectively. The comparison of the non-crisis to the crisis figures reveals an interesting pattern.
The association of jumps and news is stronger in the crisis subsample than in the non-crisis
subsample. Both the probability of news to cause a jump as well as the fraction of jumps
related to news announcements are substantially greater in the crisis sample than in the non-
crisis subsample for almost all delta and maturity categories. In the most pronounced case
(short-term DOTM calls), the probability of a news announcement triggering a jump is almost
three times greater in the crisis sample than in the non-crisis subsample. This suggests that
option markets have been more sensitive to the release of macroeconomic news announcements
during the crisis period than in the non-crisis period.
Finally, Panels A and B (C and D) of Table 10 report P (News|Jump) and P (Jump|News)
disaggregated by news items for the non-crisis (crisis) period. We can see that the results are in
line with the results aggregated over all announcements as well as with the results over the full
sample (Subsection 4.2). The NFP report as well as the IJC turn out to be the news items most
associated with jumps in both periods. Also, the jump-news relation appears to be stronger in
the crisis period than in the non-crisis period.
The more pronounced clustering of option price jumps around the release of scheduled news
in the crisis period also raises the question of whether the news content is more powerful in
explaining the occurrence of option price jumps in the crisis period. In fact, the empirical
evidence in the context of spot markets suggests that macroeconomic news surprises affect
equity prices differently depending on the state of the business cycle (Andersen et al., 2007).
This diverse response of jumps to news surprises across different states of the economy might
also carry over to option markets.
We re-estimate the logistic regression equation (11) on the crisis subsample to provide
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insight on whether the news content is more powerful in explaining the occurrence of option
price jumps in this period. Table 11 reports the estimation results. Surprisingly, even though
we find the association between news events and option price jumps is stronger in the crisis
period, the explanatory power of the content of news surprises for option price jumps turns out
to be low. Only three news surprise coefficients turn out to be significant.
As a further robustness check, we examine the dynamics of option market illiquidity over
the non-crisis and crisis periods. Given that we find that the likelihood of option price jumps
is similar across the crisis and non-crisis subsamples, one would expect the dynamics of option
market illiquidity not to differ either. This is because our results over the full sample period
suggest that the arrival of option price jumps is mostly driven by the option market’s illiquidity.
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of the daily average relative bid-ask spread for short-term
options of the various delta categories. Similar plots for the remaining maturities are in the
Online Appendix. We can see that the dynamics of option market illiquidity are comparable
in the non-crisis and crisis periods. In particular, the dynamics of illiquidity do not appear
to be any more erratic in the crisis subsample than in the non-crisis subsample. This is in
line with our previous finding that option price jumps are equally likely in the non-crisis and
crisis periods provided option price jumps are driven by option market illiquidity. Hence, we
conclude that the results from the subsample analysis further confirm that it is liquidity and
not the content of news shocks that drive jumps in option prices.
5.2 Unscheduled news announcements
As a second robustness check, we extend the set of information shocks considered in our analysis.
The vast majority of studies examining news announcement effects on financial markets have
focussed on the analysis of scheduled news announcements (Andersen et al., 2007; Lahaye et al.,
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2011). Our list of scheduled macroeconomic news (see Table 2) includes the news items most
commonly used in the literature and it can be regarded as a comprehensive list of the universe
of scheduled information shocks. However, information shocks might also arise from the release
of unscheduled news.
In what follows, we match detected option price jumps with a set of unscheduled news
announcements. The list of announcements considered is taken from Jiang et al. (2012) and
it includes 137 unscheduled announcement items. The selection of these items is based on the
chronology of significant events of the California Department of Finance, the crisis time line
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and the European crisis time line provided
by Bloomberg.
Tracing the exact intraday timing of an unscheduled news announcement is not feasible
because different data sources provide a different timing. Hence, we match detected option
price jumps with unscheduled news announcements on a daily level. In particular, we define
an unscheduled news day to be the day on which at least one unscheduled news announcement
has been released and we compute the fraction of jump days that are equal to unscheduled
news days. A remark is in order at this point. Seventy-two of the unscheduled news days
in our sample coincide with scheduled news days as well. Consequently, it is not possible to
unambiguously attribute a jump day to either unscheduled or scheduled news on these days.
Therefore, we only retain unscheduled news days on which there has been no release of scheduled
news.
Table 12 reports the results of the resulting jump day-unscheduled news day matching.
We can see that unscheduled news play a minor role in explaining option price jump days.
Only up to 6% of the detected option price jump days might be attributed to the release
of unscheduled news across all delta/maturity categories. Hence, we can conclude that by
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focussing on our set of scheduled news announcements, we do not ignore any relevant effect
arising from unscheduled news announcements. Furthermore, the unimportance of unscheduled
news for explaining option price jumps is consistent with liquidity being the most important
jump determinant. This is because unscheduled news announcements occur unexpectedly by
definition and thus they cannot adversely affect market liquidity through the informed trading
channel described in Subection 4.4.
6 The case of S&P 500 index options
We extend our analysis by considering S&P 500 index options. S&P 500 index options are
actively traded on the CBOE from 9:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. EST over our entire sample period,
i.e., at times beyond 8:30 a.m. EST, which is when most scheduled macroeconomic news
announcements occur. The E-mini S&P 500 options market that we examined in the previous
sections, has the advantage that it is a 24-hour market and thus, we can match scheduled
macroeconomic news announcements to the detected jumps. In the case of the S&P 500 index
options, we capture, even imperfectly, the effect of pre-market opening news announcements
by considering overnight returns.
We obtain OPRA trade and quote data on the S&P 500 index options from TickData for the
period from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010. This data set includes bid and ask quotes,
quote size, trade price, and trade size time-stamped at least down to the second. We sample
quotes from 9:30 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. EST. We apply the same filters as the ones used in our
main analysis to remove noisy data and minimize the effect of microstructure noise (Barndorff-
Nielsen et al., 2009). Next, we group options into the maturity and delta buckets shown in
Table 1. To allocate each intraday observation to a delta bucket, we estimate implied volatility
and delta using the Black (1976) model. We consider the mid-quote of the shortest E-mini
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futures contract as the underlying asset price of S&P 500 index options; this is different from
the underlying asset price of E-mini options, where we use the mid-quote of the E-mini futures
contract with the same or nearest maturity to the option contract. To avoid non-synchronicity
concerns, we match the shortest E-mini S&P 500 futures quotes to simultaneous S&P 500 index
option quotes. We also proxy intraday interest rates with the daily linearly interpolated U.S.
LIBOR rates (LIBOR maturities between one week and one year).
Once we group our options data, we calculate 10-minute returns for the underlying shortest
e-mini S&P 500 futures contract and each one of the 18 options buckets. Given that the
majority of the news announcements occurs at 8:30 a.m. EST, i.e., before the S&P 500 index
option market opens, we also calculate overnight returns, in addition to the over-day returns.
We calculate overnight returns using quotes from the last 10-minute interval of the previous
day and the first 10-minute interval of the current day. Subsequently, we apply the LM test to
detect jumps.
Overall, we find that jumps are idiosyncratic in the sense that they do not jump simulta-
neously (i.e., with the same 10-minute interval), just as was the case with the E-mini options
market. We also document that a fraction of the detected jumps is linked to scheduled macroe-
conomic news announcements; in 4.7% to 10.8% of the cases, a news announcement triggers a
jump. Finally, we find that illiquidity is not the key determinant of option jumps. In fact, the
content of news announcements (and not illiquidity variables) significantly affects the proba-
bility of a news-related S&P 500 option price jumps. Moreover, the relative bid-ask spread is




We provide first-time evidence on the characteristics and drivers of option price jumps by
employing high-frequency index options quotes from a limit order book market. We find that
E-mini S&P 500 option price jumps are rare, sizeable, do not occur simultaneously across
strikes and maturities, and are uncorrelated with jumps in the underlying futures price. On the
other hand, only 14% to 28% of the detected option price jumps are associated with scheduled
releases. However, even though news announcements trigger a fraction of option price jumps,
the specific news content does not. Instead, we find that the option market’s liquidity measured
by option bid-ask spreads drives option price jumps. Moreover, we document that the increase
in option bid-ask spreads is not explained by trading activity.
Our findings have three implications. First, jumps in E-mini S&P 500 option quotes are
idiosyncratic. This extends the findings of Sheikh and Ronn (1994) and Bakshi et al. (2000),
who document that total (i.e., the sum of continuous and discontinuous) option returns exhibit
heterogeneous dynamics across traded option contracts. Second, the E-mini S&P 500 option
market is segmented from the underlying market in terms of the discontinuous changes in asset
prices. This complements the findings of Bakshi et al. (2000), who find that option prices do
not always move in line with the underlying asset price. Third, the fact that liquidity rather
than the content of information shocks drives E-mini S&P 500 option price jumps may also
be explained by the fact that illiquidity increases prior to news announcements so that traders
protect themselves against informed traders. Our evidence also suggests that the informational
advantage in this option market is not due to some private information as a result of information
leakage prior to an announcement. Instead, the information asymmetry stems from the fact
that some investors may be more skilled in processing the released information than others,
thus making market makers increase bid-ask spreads; this increase is manifested as an option
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price jump. Interestingly, in the case of the S&P 500 index options market, where we also find
sizable and idiosyncratic price jumps, the content of news announcements (and not illiquidity)
is the key determinant of option jumps.
Our analysis can be extended to other option markets to check whether our findings carry
through there as well. It would also be worth exploring whether option pricing models proposed
by previous studies can generate the documented jump patterns in option prices. If they do not,
one should look into developing a limit order book market microstructure model that generates
idiosyncratic jumps in the cross-section of option prices. Moreover, our results support the
call for incorporating option market liquidity risk into option pricing theory (Christoffersen
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Table 1: Option categories
Delta interval/
Category Name Time to expiration T (in days)
Panel A: Delta categories
1 Deep out-of-the-money (DOTM) put −0.125 < ∆ ≤ −0.02
2 Out-of-the-money (OTM) put −0.375 < ∆ ≤ −0.125
3 At-the-money (ATM) put −0.625 < ∆ ≤ −0.375
4 At-the-money (ATM) call 0.375 < ∆ ≤ 0.625
5 Out-of-the-money (OTM) call 0.125 < ∆ ≤ 0.375
6 Deep out-of-the-money (DOTM) call 0.02 < ∆ ≤ 0.125
Panel B: Maturity categories
1 Short-term options 10 ≤ T ≤ 40
2 Medium-term options 40 < T ≤ 70
3 Long-term options 70 < T ≤ 100
Entries report the definition of the option delta categories in terms of their Black (1976) options delta







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Summary statistics of detected jumps
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Short-term options
# Observations 62,142 63,142 62,734 62,815 63,074 61,549 64,665
# Days 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437 1437
# Jumps 289 169 171 200 139 297 95
# Jump days 231 134 128 161 111 246 72
P (Jump day) 16.08% 9.32% 8.91% 11.20% 7.72% 17.12% 5.01%
P(Jump) 0.47% 0.27% 0.27% 0.32% 0.22% 0.48% 0.15%
Avg. jump size -23.84% -25.35% -14.85% -16.12% -28.15% -63.35% -0.07%
Avg. positive jump size 61.79% 43.80% 33.76% 37.03% 46.85% 71.59% 0.85%
Avg. negative jump size -86.40% -55.24% -27.81% -29.41% -77.26% -115.68% -0.83%
% Negative jumps 57.79% 69.82% 78.95% 80.00% 60.43% 72.05% 54.74%
Medium-term options
# Observations 60,814 62,234 61,958 62,062 62,124 60,540 64,755
# Days 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 1439
# Jumps 228 129 159 106 150 263 92
# Jump days 181 100 111 80 125 218 70
P (Jump day) 12.58% 6.95% 7.71% 5.56% 8.69% 15.15% 4.86%
P (Jump) 0.37% 0.21% 0.26% 0.17% 0.24% 0.43% 0.14%
Avg. jump size -5.93% -7.80% -5.06% -12.97% -7.35% -29.60% -0.07%
Avg. positive jump size 34.40% 29.28% 26.09% 24.49% 34.78% 49.32% 0.84%
Avg. negative jump size -54.88% -34.50% -14.50% -19.63% -44.22% -80.78% -0.84%
% Negative jumps 45.18% 58.14% 76.73% 84.91% 53.33% 60.84% 55.43%
Long-term options
# Observations 52,770 54,088 53,716 53,902 54,034 52,627 56,970
# Days 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265
# Jumps 223 106 145 72 118 296 86
# Jump days 159 80 112 62 97 222 67
P (Jump day) 12.57% 6.32% 8.85% 4.90% 7.66% 17.54% 5.29%
P (Jump) 0.42% 0.20% 0.27% 0.13% 0.22% 0.56% 0.15%
Average jump size -8.95% -9.78% -5.98% -10.24% -27.73% -21.76% -0.08%
Avg. positive jump size 28.38% 19.72% 20.47% 16.08% 30.14% 41.96% 0.87%
Avg. negative jump size -37.69% -33.28% -10.46% -15.50% -70.28% -62.82% -0.82%
% Negative jumps 56.50% 55.66% 85.52% 83.33% 57.63% 60.81% 55.81%
Entries report summary statistics for the detected jumps in 10-minute returns on E-mini options for any
given delta and maturity bucket. The number of 10-minute return observations, days, detected jumps,
jump days (days with at least one jump), and the probability of a jump day to occur P (Jump Day),
the probability of a jump to occur P (Jump), the average size for positive jumps, the average size of
negative jumps, and the number of negative jumps as a fraction of all jumps are reported. We use
the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump detection methodology based on a significance level of α = 0.1% to
detect jumps. The sample period is January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010.
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Table 4: Summary statistics of quoted sizes
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel A: Short-term options
Unconditional
Avg. bid size 240.10 451.58 393.33 388.44 504.65 255.87
Avg. ask size 226.79 437.54 364.30 355.92 462.23 233.12
Avg. trading volume 98.22 105.1296 34.26 53.75 88.75 57.40
Conditional on jump
Avg. bid size 90.69 172.15 220.94 233.18 171.01 137.14
Avg. ask size 140.59 161.22 199.85 189.87 161.79 162.55
Avg. trading volume 82.93 123.59 61.37 38.35 79.53 58.77
Panel B: Medium-term options
Unconditional
Avg. bid size 293.08 484.19 377.78 375.43 477.77 266.47
Avg. ask size 268.22 420.91 335.25 354.28 415.48 217.79
Avg. trading volume 30.41 35.83 9.35 10.85 27.53 17.68
Conditional on jump
Avg. bid size 159.13 223.07 245.57 273.67 178.37 144.79
Avg. ask size 175.27 201.45 214.27 204.17 158.28 159.60
Avg. trading volume 33.78 73.40 23.83 23.66 24.20 25.41
Panel C: Long-term options
Unconditional
Avg. bid size 351.33 417.40 347.47 336.48 420.45 270.39
Avg. ask size 306.99 359.16 305.73 312.79 347.60 234.67
Avg. trading volume 11.29 15.04 4.39 5.00 10.17 6.86
Conditional on jump
Avg. bid size 158.91 245.07 266.19 241.86 180.94 154.00
Avg. ask size 174.88 198.63 202.72 222.64 153.53 146.14
Avg. trading volume 14.62 59.42 17.46 3.47 22.17 4.96
Entries report the average bid and ask trade sizes at the best bid and ask prices, respectively, for any
given delta and maturity category. Figures are reported separately for all observations and the jump-
related observations. Jumps have been detected using the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump detection
methodology based on a significance level of α = 0.1%. The average trade size is also reported. The
sample spans January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010.
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Table 5: Relation between jumps and scheduled news announcements
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel A: Aggregated over all news items
Short-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 60 42 40 57 39 61 23
P (News|Jump) 20.76% 24.85% 23.39% 28.50% 28.06% 20.54% 24.21%
P (Jump|News) 6.75% 4.72% 4.50% 6.41% 4.39% 6.86% 2.59%
Medium-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 34 35 25 19 35 43 25
P (News|Jump) 14.91% 27.13% 15.72% 17.92% 23.33% 16.35% 27.17%
P (Jump|News) 3.82% 3.94% 2.81% 2.14% 3.94% 4.84% 2.81%
Long-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 32 21 21 12 33 44 23
P (News|Jump) 14.35% 19.81% 14.48% 16.67% 27.97% 14.86% 26.74%
P (Jump|News) 3.60% 2.36% 2.36% 1.35% 3.71% 4.95% 2.59%
Continued on next page
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Table 5: Relation between jumps and scheduled news announcements
Continued from previous page
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel B: P (News|Jump) disaggregated by news items
Short-term options
NFP 5.19% 8.88% 6.43% 6.00% 5.04% 4.38% 11.58%
CCI 0.35% 0.00% 1.75% 1.50% 0.00% 1.35% 0.00%
CPI 2.42% 2.37% 2.92% 3.50% 4.32% 0.67% 0.00%
DGO 2.08% 0.59% 2.92% 2.00% 1.44% 2.02% 0.00%
FOMC 0.69% 1.18% 2.34% 1.50% 2.16% 0.67% 9.47%
GDP 2.08% 1.78% 1.75% 3.50% 2.88% 2.69% 1.05%
IJC 7.96% 5.92% 7.60% 9.50% 11.51% 8.75% 1.05%
LI 0.35% 0.00% 0.58% 0.50% 0.00% 0.34% 0.00%
NHS 0.35% 0.59% 0.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.67% 1.05%
PPI 1.73% 4.14% 0.00% 1.50% 1.44% 1.68% 0.00%
RSA 1.04% 3.55% 0.00% 1.00% 2.88% 1.01% 0.00%
Medium-term options
NFP 6.14% 8.53% 5.66% 5.66% 10.00% 2.28% 14.13%
CCI 0.00% 0.78% 1.89% 1.89% 0.67% 0.38% 0.00%
CPI 0.88% 0.78% 1.89% 0.94% 1.33% 2.28% 0.00%
DGO 0.44% 1.55% 0.63% 0.00% 2.67% 1.52% 0.00%
FOMC 1.75% 3.10% 2.52% 1.89% 1.33% 0.76% 9.78%
GDP 0.44% 3.88% 0.00% 1.89% 1.33% 0.76% 1.09%
IJC 3.07% 10.08% 1.89% 4.72% 5.33% 6.08% 1.09%
LI 0.44% 0.78% 0.00% 0.00% 0.67% 1.14% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 0.63% 1.89% 0.67% 0.76% 1.09%
PPI 1.32% 0.78% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.76% 0.00%
RSA 0.44% 1.55% 0.00% 0.94% 0.67% 0.76% 0.00%
Long-term options
NFP 3.14% 6.60% 4.14% 5.56% 7.63% 3.04% 10.47%
CCI 1.35% 1.89% 2.07% 0.00% 3.39% 0.00% 2.33%
CPI 0.90% 0.00% 1.38% 0.00% 5.93% 1.01% 0.00%
DGO 2.69% 0.00% 0.69% 0.00% 0.85% 1.69% 0.00%
FOMC 0.45% 3.77% 3.45% 1.39% 1.69% 1.35% 10.47%
GDP 0.90% 0.94% 0.00% 1.39% 3.39% 1.69% 1.16%
IJC 4.04% 5.66% 0.69% 2.78% 8.47% 3.72% 1.16%
LI 1.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.68% 0.00%
NHS 0.90% 0.94% 2.07% 1.39% 0.00% 0.34% 1.16%
PPI 0.45% 0.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.85% 1.35% 0.00%
RSA 0.45% 0.94% 0.00% 5.56% 0.00% 2.36% 0.00%
Continued on next page
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Table 5: Relation between jumps and scheduled news announcements
Continued from previous page
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel C: P (Jump|News) disaggregated by news items
Short-term options
NFP 20.83% 20.83% 15.28% 16.67% 9.72% 18.06% 15.28%
CCI 1.39% 0.00% 4.17% 4.17% 0.00% 5.56% 0.00%
CPI 9.72% 5.56% 6.94% 9.72% 8.33% 2.78% 0.00%
DGO 8.33% 1.39% 6.94% 5.56% 2.78% 8.33% 0.00%
FOMC 4.00% 4.00% 8.00% 6.00% 6.00% 4.00% 18.00%
GDP 8.33% 4.17% 4.17% 9.72% 5.56% 11.11% 1.39%
IJC 7.35% 3.19% 4.15% 6.07% 5.11% 8.31% 0.32%
LI 1.39% 0.00% 1.39% 1.39% 0.00% 1.39% 0.00%
NHS 1.39% 1.39% 0.00% 2.78% 0.00% 2.78% 1.39%
PPI 6.94% 9.72% 0.00% 4.17% 2.78% 6.94% 0.00%
RSA 4.17% 8.33% 0.00% 2.78% 5.56% 4.17% 0.00%
Medium-term options
NFP 19.44% 15.28% 12.50% 8.33% 20.83% 8.33% 18.06%
CCI 0.00% 1.39% 4.17% 2.78% 1.39% 1.39% 0.00%
CPI 2.78% 1.39% 4.17% 1.39% 2.78% 8.33% 0.00%
DGO 1.39% 2.78% 1.39% 0.00% 5.56% 5.56% 0.00%
FOMC 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 18.00%
GDP 1.39% 6.94% 0.00% 2.78% 2.78% 2.78% 1.39%
IJC 2.24% 4.15% 0.96% 1.60% 2.56% 5.11% 0.32%
LI 1.39% 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 1.39% 4.17% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 1.39% 2.78% 1.39% 2.78% 1.39%
PPI 4.17% 1.39% 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 2.78% 0.00%
RSA 1.39% 2.78% 0.00% 1.39% 1.39% 2.78% 0.00%
Long-term options
NFP 9.72% 9.72% 8.33% 5.56% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50%
CCI 4.17% 2.78% 4.17% 0.00% 5.56% 0.00% 2.78%
CPI 2.78% 0.00% 2.78% 0.00% 9.72% 4.17% 0.00%
DGO 8.33% 0.00% 1.39% 0.00% 1.39% 6.94% 0.00%
FOMC 2.00% 8.00% 10.00% 2.00% 4.00% 8.00% 18.00%
GDP 2.78% 1.39% 0.00% 1.39% 5.56% 6.94% 1.39%
IJC 2.88% 1.92% 0.32% 0.64% 3.19% 3.51% 0.32%
LI 4.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.78% 0.00%
NHS 2.78% 1.39% 4.17% 1.39% 0.00% 1.39% 1.39%
PPI 1.39% 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 1.39% 5.56% 0.00%
RSA 1.39% 1.39% 0.00% 5.56% 0.00% 9.72% 0.00%
Entries report summary statistics on the relation between detected jumps and scheduled macroeco-
nomic news announcement items for all investigated delta and maturity categories. The probability of
a jump being related to a specific news announcement P (News|Jump) and the probability of a news
announcement leading to a jump P (Jump|News) are reported. Panel A reports these statistics aggre-
gated over all considered news announcement items and Panels B and C report them disaggregated by
individual announcement items. Jumps have been detected using the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump
detection methodology based on a significance level of α = 0.1%. A jump is defined to be related to
news if it occurred within ±10 minutes of a scheduled news announcement.
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Table 6: Information shocks and illiquidity as jump determinants
Short-term Medium-term Long-term
Panel A: News covariates
c -3.8579*** -4.1575*** -4.8081***
NFPt 0.7506*** 0.6315** -0.0617
CCIt -1.0005 -0.6084 -0.0903
CPIt 0.2371 -0.2751 0.2545
DGOt 0.1317 -0.9814 -1.1075
FOMCt - - -
GDPt 0.1568 -0.1131 0.7241***
IJCt 0.287* -0.0701 0.1289
LIt -0.9801 -0.6891 -
NHSt - -6.6603 -
PPIt -0.0452 -0.137 -0.0892
RSASt -0.1407 -1.0811 0.7789**
Panel B: News and liquidity covariates
c -3.4309*** -3.7201*** -4.1162***
sBAt−1 0.1161*** 0.1431*** 0.1737***
BidSizet−1 -0.0026** -0.002 -0.0025
AskSizet−1 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0035
NFPt 0.5904*** 0.5042** -0.2296
CCIt -0.4622 -0.2161 0.2941
CPIt 0.1338 -0.3598 0.0227
DGOt 0.0592 -1.0874 -1.3451
FOMCt - - -
GDPt -0.0079 -0.3073 0.6001**
IJCt 0.1776 -0.2565 -0.1036
LIt -0.4828 -0.3253 -
NHSt - -4.9552 -
PPIt -0.1628 -0.2543 -0.3161
RSAt -0.2575 -1.0971 0.4082
Entries report the estimation results for the logistic regression models in equations (8) and (9) (Panels
A and B, respectively). The estimation is performed separately for short-, medium-, and long-term
options on a sample pooled across all delta categories. Only news-related observations are considered.
The estimation is performed via maximum likelihood and ***, **, and * report statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is January 1, 2005 to December 31,
2010.
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Table 7: Information shocks, volume, and illiquidity as jump determinants
Short-term Medium-term Long-term
Panel A: News, volume, and liquidity covariates
c -3.4042*** -3.6822*** -4.0221***
sBAt−1 0.1142*** 0.1463*** 0.1703***
BidSizet−1 -0.0025** -0.0021 -0.0026
AskSizet−1 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0037
V olumet−1,t -0.002 0.0024 0.0011
NFPt 0.5879*** 0.4857* -0.2329
CCIt -0.3124 -0.3031 0.2957
CPIt 0.1126 -0.3878 0.0331
DGOt 0.0448 -1.1291 -1.4186
FOMCt - - -
GDPt -0.0156 -0.3327 0.5768**
IJCt 0.1623 -0.2235 -0.1085
LIt -0.3449 -0.3942 -
NHSt - -5.4217 -
PPIt -0.1783 -0.28 -0.304
RSAt -0.2734 -1.1052 0.4241
Panel B: Volume and liquidity covariates for no-news related jumps
c -5.2846*** -5.3888*** -5.1133***
sBAt−1 0.3338*** 0.292*** 0.2353***
BidSizet−1 -0.0028*** -0.0019*** -0.0023***
AskSizet−1 -0.0022*** -0.0024*** -0.0025***
V olumet−1,t 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0013***
Entries report the estimation results for the logistic regression models in equations (11) and (12)
(Panels A and B, respectively). The estimation is performed separately for short-, medium-, and
long-term options on a sample pooled across all delta categories. Panel A considers only news-related
observations and Panel B considers only non-news-related observations. The estimation is performed
via maximum likelihood and ***, **, and * report statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The sample period is January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010.
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Table 8: Summary statistics of detected jumps (non-crisis and crisis subsamples)
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel A: Non-crisis subsample
Short-term options
# Observations 25,501 26,419 26,044 26,122 26,359 24,912 27,720
# Jumps 149 98 54 101 88 115 40
# Jump days 124 78 46 85 68 95 32
P (Jump day) 20.13% 12.66% 7.47% 13.80% 11.04% 15.42% 5.19%
P (Jump) 0.58% 0.37% 0.21% 0.39% 0.33% 0.46% 0.14%
Avg. jump size -31.44% -30.79% -19.93% -21.31% -36.98% -35.99% 0.00%
% Negative jumps 59.73% 71.43% 85.19% 83.17% 62.50% 66.96% 50.00%
Medium-term options
# Observations 24,237 25,356 25,092 25,204 25,262 23,937 27,540
# Jumps 120 55 47 54 89 98 39
# Jump days 97 45 36 44 75 83 31
P (Jump day) 15.85% 7.35% 5.88% 7.19% 12.25% 13.56% 5.07%
P (Jump) 0.50% 0.22% 0.19% 0.21% 0.35% 0.41% 0.14%
Avg. jump size -5.49% -11.71% -14.79% -10.78% -4.17% -16.26% 0.00%
% Negative jumps 46.67% 65.45% 95.74% 87.04% 47.19% 50.00% 51.28%
Long-term options
# Observations 17,569 18,427 18,082 18,252 18,369 17,431 20,700
# Jumps 116 38 43 37 44 103 36
# Jump days 77 28 36 35 36 79 30
P (Jump day) 16.74% 6.09% 7.83% 7.63% 7.83% 17.17% 6.52%
P (Jump) 0.66% 0.21% 0.24% 0.20% 0.24% 0.59% 0.17%
Avg. jump size -3.60% -2.04% -9.34% -7.08% -5.81% -21.31% -0.02%
% Negative jumps 48.28% 55.26% 93.02% 86.49% 61.36% 53.40% 52.78%
Continued on next page
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Table 8: Summary statistics of detected jumps (non-crisis and crisis subsamples)
Continued from previous page
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel B: Crisis subsample
Short-term options
# Observations 36,596 36,678 36,645 36,648 36,670 36,592 36,900
# Jumps 140 71 117 99 51 182 55
# Jump days 107 56 82 76 43 151 40
P (Jump day) 13.05% 6.83% 10.00% 9.27% 5.24% 18.41% 4.88%
P (Jump) 0.38% 0.19% 0.32% 0.27% 0.14% 0.50% 0.15%
Avg. jump size -32.31% -30.03% -17.59% -21.40% -56.32% -50.81% 0.06%
% Negative jumps 60.71% 71.83% 82.91% 82.83% 72.55% 70.88% 47.27%
Medium-term options
# Observations 36,532 36,833 36,821 36,813 36,817 36,558 37,170
# Jumps 107 74 112 52 61 165 53
# Jump days 83 55 75 36 50 135 39
P (Jump day) 10.05% 6.66% 9.08% 4.36% 6.05% 16.34% 4.72%
P (Jump) 0.29% 0.20% 0.30% 0.14% 0.17% 0.45% 0.14%
Avg. jump size -3.13% -9.71% -5.89% -12.40% -12.36% -29.17% 0.06%
% Negative jumps 45.79% 66.22% 80.36% 90.38% 57.38% 60.61% 49.06%
Long-term options
# Observations 35,156 35,616 35,590 35,606 35,620 35,151 36,225
# Jumps 107 68 102 35 74 193 50
# Jump days 82 52 76 27 61 143 37
P (Jump day) 10.20% 6.46% 9.44% 3.35% 7.58% 17.76% 4.60%
P (Jump) 0.30% 0.19% 0.29% 0.10% 0.21% 0.55% 0.14%
Avg. jump size -3.87% -7.75% -5.59% -7.77% -17.44% -28.65% 0.01%
% Negative jumps 48.60% 61.76% 87.25% 88.57% 54.05% 62.69% 50.00%
Entries report summary statistics for the detected jumps for all investigated delta and maturity cate-
gories over the non-crisis subsample (Panel A) and crisis subsample (Panel B). The number of detected
jumps, the number of jump days (days with at least one jump), the probability of a jump day to occur
P (Jump Day), the probability of a jump to occur P (Jump) and the number of negative jumps as a
fraction of all jumps are reported. Jumps have been detected using the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump
detection methodology based on a significance level of α = 0.1%. The sample period is January 1, 2005
to July 31, 2007 for the non-crisis subsample and August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2010 for the crisis
subsample.
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Table 9: Relation between jumps and scheduled news announcements (non-crisis and
crisis subsamples)
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel A: Non-crisis subsample
Short-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 19 20 9 26 18 14 11
P (News|Jump) 12.75% 20.41% 16.67% 25.74% 20.45% 12.17% 27.50%
P (Jump|News) 4.95% 5.21% 2.34% 6.77% 4.69% 3.65% 2.86%
Medium-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 11 11 6 5 15 10 12
P (News|Jump) 9.17% 20.00% 12.77% 9.26% 16.85% 10.20% 30.77%
P (Jump|News) 2.86% 2.86% 1.56% 1.30% 3.91% 2.60% 3.13%
Long-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 9 5 7 1 9 9 12
P (News|Jump) 7.76% 13.16% 16.28% 2.70% 20.45% 8.74% 33.33%
P (Jump|News) 2.34% 1.30% 1.82% 0.26% 2.34% 2.34% 3.13%
Panel B: Crisis subsample
Short-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 41 22 31 31 21 47 12
P (News|Jump) 29.29% 30.99% 26.50% 31.31% 41.18% 25.82% 21.82%
P (Jump|News) 8.13% 4.37% 6.15% 6.15% 4.17% 9.33% 2.38%
Medium-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 23 24 19 14 20 33 13
P (News|Jump) 21.50% 32.43% 16.96% 26.92% 32.79% 20.00% 24.53%
P (Jump|News) 4.56% 4.76% 3.77% 2.78% 3.97% 6.55% 2.58%
Long-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 23 16 14 11 24 35 11
P (News|Jump) 21.50% 23.53% 13.73% 31.43% 32.43% 18.13% 22.00%
P (Jump|News) 4.56% 3.17% 2.78% 2.18% 4.76% 6.94% 2.18%
Entries report summary statistics on the relation between detected jumps and macroeconomic news an-
nouncements for all investigated delta and maturity categories over the non-crisis subsample (Panel A)
and crisis subsample (Panel B). The number of jumps that occurred within ±10 minutes of a scheduled
news announcement, the probability of a news announcement leading to a jump P (Jump|News) as
well as the probability of a jump being related to a news announcement P (News|Jump) are reported.
Jumps have been detected using the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump detection methodology based on a
significance level of α = 0.1%. The sample period is January 1, 2005 to July 31, 2007 for the non-crisis
and August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2010 for the crisis subsample.
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Table 10: Relation between jumps and scheduled news announcements disaggregated by
announcement items (non-crisis and crisis subsamples)
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel A: P (News|Jump) over the non-crisis subsample
Short-term options
NFP 1.34% 4.08% 5.56% 1.98% 2.27% 1.74% 10.00%
CCI 0.67% 0.00% 1.85% 0.00% 0.00% 2.61% 0.00%
CPI 2.68% 3.06% 3.70% 4.95% 2.27% 0.87% 0.00%
DGO 2.01% 0.00% 1.85% 0.00% 2.27% 0.87% 0.00%
FOMC 0.00% 0.00% 1.85% 0.99% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50%
GDP 2.68% 0.00% 1.85% 2.97% 1.14% 0.00% 0.00%
IJC 3.36% 8.16% 0.00% 11.88% 10.23% 3.48% 2.50%
LI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.99% 0.00% 0.00% 2.50%
PPI 0.67% 6.12% 0.00% 1.98% 2.27% 2.61% 0.00%
RSA 0.00% 5.10% 0.00% 1.98% 1.14% 0.87% 0.00%
Medium-term options
NFP 3.33% 7.27% 2.13% 0.00% 7.87% 2.04% 12.82%
CCI 0.00% 0.00% 2.13% 1.85% 1.12% 0.00% 0.00%
CPI 0.83% 1.82% 4.26% 1.85% 2.25% 2.04% 0.00%
DGO 0.83% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.02% 0.00%
FOMC 0.83% 1.82% 2.13% 0.00% 0.00% 1.02% 12.82%
GDP 0.83% 5.45% 0.00% 1.85% 1.12% 1.02% 0.00%
IJC 0.83% 3.64% 2.13% 1.85% 3.37% 0.00% 2.56%
LI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.12% 1.02% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.85% 0.00% 1.02% 2.56%
PPI 1.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
RSA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.12% 1.02% 0.00%
Long-term options
NFP 0.86% 2.63% 2.33% 0.00% 4.55% 2.91% 8.33%
CCI 2.59% 2.63% 2.33% 0.00% 6.82% 0.00% 5.56%
CPI 0.00% 0.00% 2.33% 0.00% 4.55% 0.00% 0.00%
DGO 1.72% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.97% 0.00%
FOMC 0.00% 5.26% 4.65% 0.00% 0.00% 2.91% 13.89%
GDP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.91% 0.00%
IJC 0.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.55% 0.00% 2.78%
LI 0.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NHS 1.72% 0.00% 4.65% 2.70% 0.00% 0.00% 2.78%
PPI 0.00% 2.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
RSA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.97% 0.00%
Continued on next page
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Table 10: Relation between jumps and scheduled news announcements
disaggregated by announcement items (non-crisis and crisis subsamples)
Continued from previous page
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel B: P (News|Jump) over the crisis subsample
Short-term options
NFP 9.29% 15.49% 6.84% 10.10% 9.80% 6.04% 12.73%
CCI 0.00% 0.00% 1.71% 3.03% 0.00% 0.55% 0.00%
CPI 2.14% 1.41% 2.56% 2.02% 7.84% 0.55% 0.00%
DGO 2.14% 1.41% 3.42% 4.04% 0.00% 2.75% 0.00%
FOMC 1.43% 2.82% 2.56% 2.02% 5.88% 1.10% 7.27%
GDP 1.43% 4.23% 1.71% 4.04% 5.88% 4.40% 1.82%
IJC 12.86% 2.82% 11.11% 7.07% 13.73% 12.09% 0.00%
LI 0.71% 0.00% 0.85% 1.01% 0.00% 0.55% 0.00%
NHS 0.71% 1.41% 0.00% 1.01% 0.00% 1.10% 0.00%
PPI 2.86% 1.41% 0.00% 1.01% 0.00% 1.10% 0.00%
RSA 2.14% 1.41% 0.00% 0.00% 5.88% 1.10% 0.00%
Medium-term options
NFP 9.35% 9.46% 7.14% 11.54% 13.11% 2.42% 15.09%
CCI 0.00% 1.35% 1.79% 1.92% 0.00% 0.61% 0.00%
CPI 0.93% 0.00% 0.89% 0.00% 0.00% 2.42% 0.00%
DGO 0.00% 2.70% 0.89% 0.00% 6.56% 1.82% 0.00%
FOMC 2.80% 4.05% 2.68% 3.85% 3.28% 0.61% 7.55%
GDP 0.00% 2.70% 0.00% 1.92% 1.64% 0.61% 1.89%
IJC 5.61% 14.86% 1.79% 7.69% 8.20% 9.70% 0.00%
LI 0.93% 1.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.21% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 0.89% 1.92% 1.64% 0.61% 0.00%
PPI 0.93% 1.35% 0.89% 0.00% 0.00% 1.21% 0.00%
RSA 0.93% 2.70% 0.00% 1.92% 0.00% 0.61% 0.00%
Long-term options
NFP 5.61% 8.82% 4.90% 11.43% 9.46% 3.11% 12.00%
CCI 0.00% 1.47% 1.96% 0.00% 1.35% 0.00% 0.00%
CPI 1.87% 0.00% 0.98% 0.00% 6.76% 1.55% 0.00%
DGO 3.74% 0.00% 0.98% 0.00% 1.35% 2.07% 0.00%
FOMC 0.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.86% 2.70% 0.52% 8.00%
GDP 1.87% 1.47% 0.00% 2.86% 5.41% 2.07% 2.00%
IJC 7.48% 8.82% 0.98% 5.71% 10.82% 5.70% 0.00%
LI 1.87% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.03% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 1.47% 0.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.52% 0.00%
PPI 0.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.35% 2.07% 0.00%
RSA 0.94% 1.47% 0.00% 11.43% 0.00% 3.11% 0.00%
Continued on next page
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Table 10: Relation between jumps and scheduled news announcements
disaggregated by announcement items (non-crisis and crisis subsamples)
Continued from previous page
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel C: P (Jump|News) over the non-crisis subsample
Short-term options
NFP 6.45% 12.90% 9.68% 6.45% 6.45% 6.45% 12.90%
CCI 3.33% 0.00% 3.33% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00%
CPI 12.90% 9.68% 6.45% 16.13% 6.45% 3.23% 0.00%
DGO 9.68% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00% 6.45% 3.23% 0.00%
FOMC 0.00% 0.00% 5.00% 5.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00%
GDP 12.90% 0.00% 3.23% 9.68% 3.23% 0.00% 0.00%
IJC 3.73% 5.97% 0.00% 8.96% 6.72% 2.99% 0.75%
LI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23%
PPI 3.23% 19.35% 0.00% 6.45% 6.45% 9.68% 0.00%
RSA 0.00% 16.13% 0.00% 6.45% 3.23% 3.23% 0.00%
Medium-term options
NFP 12.90% 12.90% 3.23% 0.00% 22.58% 6.45% 16.13%
CCI 0.00% 0.00% 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 0.00% 0.00%
CPI 3.23% 3.23% 6.45% 3.23% 6.45% 6.45% 0.00%
DGO 3.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00%
FOMC 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.00% 25.00%
GDP 3.23% 9.68% 0.00% 3.23% 3.23% 3.23% 0.00%
IJC 0.75% 1.49% 0.75% 0.75% 2.24% 0.00% 0.75%
LI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 3.23% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00% 3.23% 3.23%
PPI 6.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
RSA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 3.23% 0.00%
Long-term options
NFP 3.23% 3.23% 3.23% 0.00% 6.45% 9.68% 9.68%
CCI 10.00% 3.33% 3.33% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 6.67%
CPI 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00% 6.45% 0.00% 0.00%
DGO 6.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00%
FOMC 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 15.00% 25.00%
GDP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00%
IJC 0.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.49% 0.00% 0.75%
LI 3.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NHS 6.45% 0.00% 6.45% 3.23% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23%
PPI 0.00% 3.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
RSA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00%
Continued on next page
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Table 10: Relation between jumps and scheduled news announcements
disaggregated by announcement items (non-crisis and crisis subsamples)
Continued from previous page
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel D: P (Jump|News) over the crisis subsample
Short-term options
NFP 31.71% 26.83% 19.51% 24.39% 12.20% 26.83% 17.07%
CCI 0.00% 0.00% 4.88% 7.32% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00%
CPI 7.32% 2.44% 7.32% 4.88% 9.76% 2.44% 0.00%
DGO 7.32% 2.44% 9.76% 9.76% 0.00% 12.20% 0.00%
FOMC 6.67% 6.67% 10.00% 6.67% 10.00% 6.67% 13.33%
GDP 4.88% 7.32% 4.88% 9.76% 7.32% 19.51% 2.44%
IJC 10.06% 1.12% 7.26% 3.91% 3.91% 12.29% 0.00%
LI 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00%
NHS 2.44% 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 4.88% 0.00%
PPI 9.76% 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 4.88% 0.00%
RSA 7.32% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 7.32% 4.88% 0.00%
Medium-term options
NFP 24.39% 17.07% 19.51% 14.63% 19.51% 9.76% 19.51%
CCI 0.00% 2.44% 4.88% 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00%
CPI 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 9.76% 0.00%
DGO 0.00% 4.88% 2.44% 0.00% 9.76% 7.32% 0.00%
FOMC 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 6.67% 6.67% 3.33% 13.33%
GDP 0.00% 4.88% 0.00% 2.44% 2.44% 2.44% 2.44%
IJC 3.35% 6.15% 1.12% 2.23% 2.79% 8.94% 0.00%
LI 2.44% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.88% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 2.44% 2.44% 2.44% 2.44% 0.00%
PPI 2.44% 2.44% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 4.88% 0.00%
RSA 2.44% 4.88% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00%
Long-term options
NFP 14.63% 14.63% 12.20% 9.76% 17.07% 14.63% 14.63%
CCI 0.00% 2.44% 4.88% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00%
CPI 4.88% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 12.20% 7.32% 0.00%
DGO 9.76% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 9.76% 0.00%
FOMC 3.33% 6.67% 10.00% 3.33% 6.67% 3.33% 13.33%
GDP 4.88% 2.44% 0.00% 2.44% 9.76% 9.76% 2.44%
IJC 4.47% 3.35% 0.56% 1.12% 4.47% 6.15% 0.00%
LI 4.88% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.88% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 2.44% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00%
PPI 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.44% 9.76% 0.00%
RSA 2.44% 2.44% 0.00% 9.76% 0.00% 14.63% 0.00%
Entries report summary statistics on the relation between detected jumps and macroeconomic news
announcements disaggregated by news items for all investigated delta and maturity categories over the
non-crisis subsample (Panels A and C) and the crisis subsample (Panels B and D). The probability
of a jump to be related to a specific news announcement P (News|Jump) (Panels A and B) and the
probability of a specific news announcement leading to a jump P (Jump|News) (Panels C and D) are
reported. Jumps have been detected using the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump detection methodology
based on a significance level of α = 0.1%. Jumps are defined to be related to a news announcement
if they occurred within ±10 minutes of an announcement. The sample period is January 1, 2005 to
July 31, 2007 for the non-crisis subsample and August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2010 for the crisis
subsample.
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Table 11: Information shocks, volume, and illiquidity as jump determinants (crisis sub-
sample)
Short-term Medium-term Long-term
c -3.2964*** -3.4553*** -3.9756***
sBAt−1 0.0706* 0.132*** 0.1571***
BidSizet−1 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0005
AskSizet−1 -0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0089**
V olumet−1,t -0.0053 0.0035* 0.0017
NFPt 0.5986*** 0.2969 -0.0498
CCIt -1.7225 -10.3653 -
CPIt -0.1908 -1.0597 0.0343
DGOt -0.1901 -0.9037 -1.4842
FOMCt - - -
GDPt 0.0403 -1.5392 0.6491***
IJCt -0.0839 -0.1693 0.036
LIt -0.0886 -0.3529 -
NHSt - -4.8425 -
PPIt -0.3548 -1.9787 -
RSAt -0.3868 -0.8008 0.485
Entries report the estimation results for the logistic regression model in equation (11) over the crisis
subsample. The estimation is performed separately for short-, medium-, and long-term options on
a sample pooled across all delta categories. Only news-related observations are considered. The
estimation is performed via maximum likelihood and ***, **, and * report statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is from August 1, 2007 to December 31,
2010.
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Table 12: Relation between jumps and unscheduled news announcements
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Futures
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Short-term options
# Jump days equal to
unsched. news day 5 4 3 2 0 10 3
% Jump days equal to
% Unsched. news day 2.16% 2.99% 2.34% 1.24% 0.00% 4.07% 4.17%
Medium-term options
# Jump days equal to
unsched. news day 3 4 7 3 3 7 3
% Jump days equal to
unsched. news day 1.66% 4.00% 6.31% 3.75% 2.40% 3.21% 4.29%
Long-term options
# Jump days equal to
unsched. news day 4 4 7 1 1 9 3
% Jump days equal to
unsched. news day 2.52% 5.00% 6.25% 1.61% 1.03% 4.05% 4.48%
Entries report summary statistics on the relation between detected jumps and unscheduled news an-
nouncements for all investigated delta and maturity categories (Panels A to C). The number of jump
days that are equal to a day on which unscheduled news has been released and this number as a frac-
tion of all jump days is reported. Jumps have been detected using the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump
detection methodology based on a significance level of α = 0.1%. The sample period is from January
1, 2005 to December 31, 2010.
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Figure 1: Volatility signature plots of short-term options returns
































































































































































The figure depicts the average daily realized volatility of option returns as a function of the sampling frequency for short-term options of different
delta categories. We consider the following delta categories (defined in Table 1) for calls and puts: deep out-of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money
(OTM), and at-the-money (ATM).
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Figure 2: Distribution of Co-Jumps
Panel A: Short-term options
























Panel B: Medium-ter options






















Panel C: Long-term options























The figure illustrates the distribution of co-jump events for short-, medium-, and long-term options
(Panels A, B, and C, respectively). Co-jump events are defined by the number of concurrent jumps
across different delta levels and the underlying asset. The event of only one concurrent jump cor-
responds to an idiosyncratic jump in only one of the delta categories or the underlying asset. The
frequency of occurrence is reported for each possible co-jump event.
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Figure 3: Composition of co-jumps
Panel A: Short-term options
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Panel C: Long-term options


















The figure illustrates the composition of the most frequent co-jump events for short-, medium-, and
long-term options (Panels A, B, and C, respectively). The composition of a co-jump event is charac-
terized by the delta categories of the options and/or the underlying asset that simultaneously exhibit
a jump.
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Figure 4: Option bid-ask spreads around jumps
















































































































































































The figure illustrates the median relative option bid-ask spreads for a number of time subintervals around the news-related jumps (10 minutes
before the jump up to 60 minutes after the jump) across the various moneyness levels for the case of the short maturity options. We consider deep
out-of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money (ATM) calls and puts (defined in Table 1). The jump time corresponds to
point zero in the graph.
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The figure illustrates the frequency (in %) distribution in the two 10-minutes subintervals before news-related option price jumps of short-term
options. The frequency distribution is constructed for option trading volume buckets of zero, 10 or more than 10 contracts. We consider deep
out-of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money (ATM) calls and puts (defined in Table 1).
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Figure 6: Dynamics of short-term options’ bid-ask spreads





























































































































































The figure illustrates the time evolution of the daily average relative bid-ask spread of short-term options of different delta categories [out-of-the-
money (DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money (ATM) calls and puts as defined in Table 1] over the non-crisis and crisis subsamples.
The dashed line illustrates the non-crisis/crisis split point.
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Online Appendix to
"Jumps in option prices and their determinants: Real-time
evidence from the E-mini S&P 500 options market"
George Kapetanios§, Eirini Konstantinidia,
Michael Neumannb, George Skiadopoulosc
August 12, 2019
In this Online Appendix, we provide additional results obtained from the analysis on E-mini index
options (Sections 1-4), as well as results obtained from the analysis on the S&P 500 index options
market (Section 5).
1 Volatility signature plots
Following Andersen et al. (2000), we employ volatility signature plots of high-frequency E-mini op-
tion returns to select the "optimal" subinterval length for the calculation of the returns. Volatility
signature plots depict realized volatility as a function of the sampling frequency. In the absence of
microstructure noise, realized volatility, defined as the squared root of summed squared intraday
returns, should be invariant to changes in the sampling frequency provided the data is sampled
fine enough. Panels A, B, and C of Figure OA.1 show the volatility signature plots for the short-,
medium-, and long-term options, respectively. For each maturity category, we consider deep out-
of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money (ATM) calls and puts, as
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bIndependent, michael.neumann.ln@gmail.com
cCorresponding author. School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London, UK, and
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1
defined in Table 1 in the main paper. We can see that the realized volatilities start converging
around the 10-minute mark. Hence, we choose a subinterval length of ∆t = 10 minutes.
2 Broadening the definition of concurrent jumps
In our main analysis, we define simultaneous jumps in E-mini option prices as jumps occurring
within the same 10-minute interval. We investigate further the simultaneity of jumps across
delta and maturities categories by considering the adjacent 10-minute intervals. Focusing on
each maturity and delta bucket separately, we calculate the number of jumps that the adjacent
categories exhibit 10 minutes before, simultaneously, and 10 minutes after we detect a jump in
the bucket under consideration.
Figure OA.2 shows the number of co-jumps occurring in the three 10-minute intervals [i.e.,
(-10, 0, +10) with zero corresponding to the jump time in any given bucket]. Panels A, B, and
C show the results for the short-, medium-, and long-term contracts, respectively. We can see
that in the vast majority of the cases when we detect a jump in a specific bucket at time t = 0,
we do not detect any jumps 10 minutes before (t = −10), simultaneously (t = 0) or 10 minutes
after (t = +10) in the remaining categories. This corroborates further that the detected jumps
are predominantly idiosyncratic.
3 Volume as a jump driver
We plot the distribution of trading volume of E-mini options on the jump time, as well as ten
minutes before the jump, to check whether option jumps are driven by pre-announcement private
information. Panels A, B, and C of Figure OA.3 plot the volume distribution for any given
delta bucket for the short-, medium-, and long-term maturity options, respectively. We show the
frequency (in %) distribution of three volume buckets, which correspond to option volume of zero,
ten, and more than ten contracts, respectively. We can see that the vast majority of news related
jumps is accompanied by zero volume.
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4 Dynamics of relative bid-ask spread
As a further robustness check, we examine the dynamics of the illiquidity of the E-mini option
market over two subsamples (i.e., non-crisis and crisis periods). Given that the likelihood of
option price jumps has been found to be similar across the crisis and non-crisis subsamples, one
would expect the dynamics of option market illiquidity not to differ either. This is because our
results over the full sample period suggest that the arrival of option price jumps is mostly driven
by the illiquidity of the option market.
Panels A, B, and C of Figure OA.4 depict the evolution of the daily average relative bid-ask
spread for the various delta categories of short-, medium-, and long-term options, respectively.
The dynamics of the option market illiquidity are comparable in the non-crisis and crisis periods,
since they do not appear to be any more erratic in the crisis subsample than in the non-crisis
subsample. This is in line with the previous finding that option price jumps are equally likely
in the non-crisis and crisis periods, provided option price jumps are driven by option market
illiquidity. These results further confirm that it is liquidity, and not the content of news shocks,
that drives jumps in option prices.
5 The case of S&P 500 index options
We extend our analysis by considering S&P 500 index options which are actively traded in the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE). We obtain OPRA trade and quote data on S&P
500 index options from TickData over the period January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010. We
sample quotes from 9:30 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), i.e., at times beyond
8:30 a.m. EST, where most of the scheduled macroeconomic news announcements occur; over our
sample period, the S&P 500 options trade from 9:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. EST (Regular Trading
Hours, RTH).1
We apply the same filters as the ones used in our main analysis, to remove noisy data and
minimize the effect of microstructure noise (Barndorff-Nielsen et al., 2009). Next, we group
options into the maturity and delta buckets shown in Table 1 in the main paper, resulting in
1CBOE introduced Extended Trading Hours (ETH) by activating a trading sessions from 2:00 a.m. to 8:15
a.m. in March 2015 which is after the end of our sample period. Even after the introduction of ETH, the trading
volume over the ETH is lower than over RTH (e.g.,Bloomberg Tradebook, 2015; Stoev, 2017).
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18 different groups (three maturity and six delta groups). To allocate each intraday observation
to a delta bucket, we estimate implied volatility and delta using the Black (1976) model. We
consider the mid-quote of the shortest E-mini S&P 500 futures contract as the underlying asset
price; this is different from the underlying asset price of E-mini options where we use the mid-
quote of the E-mini futures contract with the same or nearest maturity to the option contract.
To avoid non-synchronicity concerns, we match the shortest E-mini S&P 500 futures quotes to
simultaneous S&P 500 index option quotes. We also proxy intraday interest rates with the daily
linearly interpolated U.S. LIBOR rates (LIBOR maturities between one week and one year).
Once we group the option data, we calculate 10-minute returns for the underlying shortest E-
mini S&P 500 futures contract and for each option contract of the 18 options buckets. We obtain
the 10-minute option returns using quotes for the same contract over two consecutive 10-minute
intervals. In the first 10-minute interval, we select the contract that is closest to the bucket’s
mid-delta point and we track this contract over the second 10-minute interval. If there are more
than one quotes satisfying our criteria in any of the two 10-minute intervals, we select the one
with a time-stamp closest to the end of the interval. The resulting return is time-stamped at
the end of the second 10-minute interval. Given that the majority of the news announcements
occurs at 8:30 a.m. EST (i.e., before the S&P 500 index option market opens), we also calculate
overnight returns using quotes from the last 10-minute interval of the previous day and the first
10-minute interval of the current day.
5.1 Jumps in S&P 500 index option prices
We employ the Lee and Mykland’s (LM, 2008) test to test if there are any jumps in option prices.
Table OA.1 reports summary statistics for the identified jumps. We can see that S&P 500 index
option prices jump. The number of jumps varies across maturity and delta buckets with short
maturity options exhibiting the largest number of jumps and largest average size of jumps in
absolute terms for any given delta bucket. The probability of a jump occurring ranges between
0.44% and 1.22% across maturity and delta buckets. In the case of the underlying price, the
number and size of jumps is lower than the number and size of jumps in S&P 500 index option
prices.
Next, we examine whether the prices of the options and the underlying asset co-jump. Figure
4
OA.5 shows the frequency of co-jumps events for the short-, medium-, and long-term maturity
buckets, respectively. In the vast majority of the cases, an option jump in one delta bucket is
not accompanied by simultaneous option jumps in other delta buckets. In line with our findings
for the E-mini option market, our results suggest that co-jumps are not common in the S&P 500
index option market either.
5.1.1 Information events and information shocks as drivers of option price jumps
We examine whether the release of scheduled macroeconomic news announcements explains the
occurrence of jumps by considering the occurrence of jumps within ±10 minutes from the news
announcement release. We consider the same news items as in the case the E-mini S&P 500
options: NFP, CCI, CPI, DGO, FOMC, GDP, IJC, LI, NHS, PPI, and RSA. We calculate the
conditional probability P (News|Jump) as total number jumps occurring within 10 mins from a
news announcement divided with the total number of jumps. This provides information on the
fraction of jumps associated with news announcements. We also calculate P (Jump|News) as total
number jumps occurring within 10 minutes from a news announcement divided with the total
number of news announcements. This provides information on whether a news announcement
triggers a jump. We consider both the effect of news announcements on aggregate, as well as the
effect of each individual news item, separately.
Table OA.2 reports the conditional probabilities P (News|Jump) and P (Jump|News) when
we consider all news announcement items jointly (Panel A), as well as each news announcement
item separately [Panel B for P (News|Jump) and Panel C for P (Jump|News)]. In Table OA.2
Panel A, 6.74% to 27.59% of the detected jumps are associated with scheduled macroeconomic
news announcements, the majority of which correspond to ATM put options. In the case of the
underlying asset (shortest E-mini futures contract), the number of news-related jumps differs
from the options ones. This is similar to what we document for the underlying asset of E-mini
options where the underlying E-mini futures have the same or nearest maturity to the E-mini
options. In addition, 4.72% to 10.8% of the news announcements trigger a jump across delta and
maturity buckets, which is slightly higher than the P (Jump|News) reported in the main paper
for the E-mini options market.
In Panel B, most of the detected option price jumps are associated with IJC news announce-
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ments across all delta and maturity buckets, with P (News|Jump) ranging between 1.44% to
10.07%. In the case of the underlying, the jumps are associated predominantly with FOMC an-
nouncements. In Panel C, NFP announcements followed by CPI announcements trigger most of
the option price jumps across delta and maturity buckets, whereas FOMC announcements trigger
most jumps in the underlying. The finding that various news items are related to detected jumps
in option and futures prices is in tandem with what we document for the E-mini option market.
We now extend our analysis by considering the content of the releases as a determinant of op-
tion jumps; market efficiency theory suggest that only news surprises should affect market prices.
We investigate whether news surprises affect the conditional probability of a jump occurring and







where SURj,t is the surprise of the j-th news item (j = 1, 2, ..., 11 for NFP, CCI, CPI, DGO,
FOMC, GDP, IJC, LI, NHS, PPI, and RSA respectively) and P (Jumpt|News) is the probability
of an option price jump to occur conditional on a scheduled macroeconomic announcement taking
place (1 when there is a jump at the announcement time t, and 0 otherwise). We estimate equation
(OA.1) conditional on news items being released. Moreover, due to sample size considerations,
we estimate equation (OA.1) by pooling all option return observations across delta buckets for
any given maturity category. We can see in Table OA.3 Panel A that the content of various
news items affects the probability of a jump occurring. For instance, FOMC releases increase the
probability of jumps occurring.
Overall, we document that a fraction of the detected option price jumps is associated with
scheduled macroeconomic news announcements. In line with our findings for the E-mini S&P
500 options market, our results further suggest that the segmentation of the option market and
the underlying asset holds also around scheduled macroeconomic news announcements, in the
sense that the number of news-related jumps in the underlying asset differs substantially from
the number of news-related jumps in the option market.
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5.1.2 Illiquidity and and volume as drivers of option price jumps
To investigate the role of illiquidity in the occurrence of a jump in S&P 500 index option market,
we augment the logit model given in (OA.1) with three illiquidity variables, namely bid size,
ask size, and the standardized bid-ask spread. For a given time stamp, the standardized bid-ask
spread is the bid-ask spread divided with standard deviation of the bid-ask spread of the respective
delta and maturity category. Table OA.3 Panel B shows that the content of news announcements
is significant in a number of cases. Only the ask size is significant across all three maturities. The
coefficients of the illiquidity variables are also fairly small (almost zero), suggesting that illiquidity
is not a key determinant of jumps in the S&P 500 index options market.
We verify that illiquidity is not a predominant driver of jumps in the S&P 500 index option
market by ploting the median relative bid-ask spread from 10 minutes before up to 60 minutes
after the occurrence of a jump for any given delta and maturity bucket. We can see in Figure
OA.6 that the relative bid-ask spread is relatively stable around the occurrence of a jump for any
given bucket. This results is in contrast to the findings for the E-mini options market where we
document that illiquidity is an important driver of jumps.
We further investigate whether asymmetric information in the spirit described in the main
body of the paper, is at play, by augmenting the logit model given in equation (OA.1) with three
illiquidity variables, as well as the trading volume in the respective delta and maturity category.
Table OA.3 Panel C shows that trading volume is not related with the probability of a jump
occurring.
Overall, the results suggest information events and their content are the main drivers of jumps
in the S&P 500 index option prices. This is not the case for the E-mini S&P 500 option market
where illiquidity and asymmetric information among traders plays a key role.
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Table OA.1: Summary statistics of detected jumps - S&P 500 index options
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Underlying
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Short-term options
# Observations 54793 54793 54793 54793 54793 54793 50319
# Days 1479 1479 1479 1479 1479 1479 1436
# Jumps 671 642 479 545 652 623 54
# Jump days 310 299 271 263 280 263 43
P(Jump day) 20.96% 20.22% 18.32% 17.78% 18.93% 17.78% 2.99%
P(Jump) 1.22% 1.17% 0.87% 0.99% 1.19% 1.14% 0.11%
Avg. positive jump size 152.59% 64.00% 43.16% 47.03% 110.33% 182.20% 0.91%
Avg. negative jump size -67.20% -121.10% -45.27% -78.62% -141.54% -67.71% -0.15%
% Negative jumps 25.34% 59.97% 57.62% 68.62% 51.07% 25.68% 57.41%
Medium-term options
# Observations 54817 54817 54817 54818 54817 54817 50319
# Days 1481 1481 1481 1481 1481 1481 1436
# Jumps 306 284 298 300 242 324 54
# Jump days 186 177 200 186 144 182 43
P(Jump day) 12.56% 11.95% 13.50% 12.55% 9.72% 12.29% 2.99%
P(Jump) 0.56% 0.52% 0.54% 0.55% 0.44% 0.59% 0.11%
Avg. positive jump size 23.26% 20.82% 17.30% 17.88% 21.03% 29.70% 0.91%
Avg. negative jump size -22.53% -15.37% -14.18% -13.26% -17.02% -43.26% -0.15%
% Negative jumps 49.02% 47.18% 49.33% 45.33% 39.67% 45.06% 57.41%
Long-term options
# Observations 54893 54891 54891 54891 54892 54897 50319
# Days 1492 1490 1490 1490 1490 1493 1436
# Jumps 353 352 348 317 321 425 54
# Jump days 186 207 219 184 163 198 43
P(Jump day) 12.47% 13.89% 14.70% 12.35% 10.94% 13.26% 2.99%
P(Jump) 0.64% 0.64% 0.63% 0.58% 0.58% 0.77% 0.11%
Avg. positive jump size 20.53% 16.08% 14.47% 12.75% 14.01% 21.69% 0.91%
Avg. negative jump size -15.13% -11.10% -10.44% -9.19% -13.70% -22.93% -0.15%
% Negative jumps 49.58% 49.43% 48.56% 46.37% 47.04% 48.24% 57.41%
Entries report summary statistics for the detected jumps in 10-minute returns on S&P 500 cash-settled
index options for any given delta and maturity bucket. The number of 10-minute return observations,
days, detected jumps, jump days (days with at least one jump), and the probability of a jump day
P (Jump Day), the probability of a jump occurring P (Jump), the average size of positive jumps, the
average size for negative jumps, and the number of negative jumps as a fraction of all jumps are reported.
We use the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump detection methodology based on a significance level of α = 0.1%
to detect jumps. The sample period is January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010.
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Table OA.2: Relation of jumps and scheduled news announcements - S&P 500 index options
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Underlying
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel A: Aggregated over all news items
Short-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 60 60 83 42 61 63 16
P(News|Jump) 8.94% 9.35% 17.15% 6.74% 9.36% 11.56% 21.92%
P(Jump|News) 6.75% 6.75% 9.34% 4.72% 6.86% 7.09% 1.80%
Medium-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 58 69 80 50 52 67 16
P(News|Jump) 18.95% 24.30% 26.85% 15.43% 21.49% 22.33% 21.92%
P(Jump|News) 6.52% 7.76% 9.00% 5.62% 5.85% 7.54% 1.80%
Long-term options
# Jumps within
10 mins of news 71 84 96 68 62 85 16
P(News|Jump) 20.11% 23.86% 27.59% 16.00% 19.31% 26.81% 21.92%
P(Jump|News) 7.99% 9.45% 10.80% 7.65% 6.97% 9.56% 1.80%
Entries report summary statistics on the relation between detected jumps and scheduled macroeconomic
news announcement items for all investigated delta and maturity buckets. The probability of a jump
being related to a specific news announcement P (News|Jump) and the probability of a news announce-
ment leading to a jump P (Jump|News) are reported. Panel A reports these statistics aggregated over all
considered news announcement items. Panels B and C report them disaggregated by individual announce-
ment items. Jumps have been detected using the Lee and Mykland (2008) jump detection methodology
based on a significance level of α = 0.1%. A jump is defined to be related to news if it occurred within
±10 minutes of a scheduled news announcement. The sample period is January 1, 2005 to December 31,
2010.
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Table OA.2: Relation of jumps and scheduled news announcements - S&P 500 index options
Continued from previous page
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Underlying
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel B: P(News | Jump) disaggregated by news items
Short-term options
NFP 1.79% 0.62% 1.45% 1.44% 0.92% 0.73% 0.00%
CCI 0.15% 0.00% 0.41% 0.16% 0.15% 0.18% 0.00%
CPI 0.89% 1.25% 2.07% 0.16% 1.07% 1.65% 0.00%
DGO 1.04% 0.78% 2.07% 0.16% 0.31% 0.73% 1.37%
FOMC 0.60% 0.47% 0.41% 0.16% 0.31% 0.37% 9.59%
GDP 0.45% 1.40% 1.24% 0.00% 0.77% 0.73% 0.00%
IJC 2.53% 3.12% 5.37% 1.44% 2.15% 2.94% 0.00%
LI 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.31% 0.00% 0.32% 0.46% 0.55% 0.00%
PPI 0.30% 0.62% 1.86% 0.16% 0.77% 0.92% 0.00%
RSA 0.45% 0.78% 1.45% 0.48% 0.46% 1.10% 0.00%
Medium-term options
NFP 1.63% 3.17% 3.02% 1.54% 2.48% 2.00% 0.00%
CCI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.31% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CPI 2.61% 3.17% 3.69% 1.54% 2.48% 3.00% 0.00%
DGO 1.96% 3.52% 3.69% 0.62% 1.65% 2.67% 1.37%
FOMC 0.98% 0.70% 1.01% 0.62% 1.24% 1.33% 9.59%
GDP 1.63% 2.46% 2.68% 0.62% 2.07% 2.33% 0.00%
IJC 6.21% 8.45% 10.07% 5.25% 6.61% 7.00% 0.00%
LI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.33% 0.00%
PPI 1.31% 2.11% 3.02% 0.93% 1.65% 2.33% 0.00%
RSA 0.65% 1.06% 1.68% 0.62% 0.83% 1.00% 0.00%
Long-term options
NFP 2.27% 2.56% 4.02% 1.65% 1.56% 2.52% 0.00%
CCI 0.28% 0.28% 0.00% 0.24% 0.31% 0.32% 0.00%
CPI 1.98% 1.99% 3.16% 0.71% 0.93% 2.52% 0.00%
DGO 1.13% 1.99% 2.59% 1.18% 1.25% 1.58% 1.37%
FOMC 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 0.00% 0.00% 0.63% 9.59%
GDP 1.70% 0.85% 1.44% 0.71% 1.56% 2.21% 0.00%
IJC 5.95% 5.97% 7.18% 3.53% 5.92% 7.26% 0.00%
LI 1.13% 0.85% 1.15% 1.18% 1.56% 1.26% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 0.00% 0.31% 0.00% 0.00%
PPI 0.57% 1.14% 0.86% 0.24% 0.31% 0.32% 0.00%
RSA 0.85% 1.42% 1.72% 0.71% 1.25% 1.26% 0.00%
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Table OA.2: Relation of jumps and scheduled news announcements - S&P 500 index options
Continued from previous page
DOTM OTM ATM ATM OTM DOTM Underlying
puts puts puts calls calls calls
Panel C: P(Jump | News) disaggregated by news items
Short-term options
CCI 1.39% 0.00% 2.78% 1.39% 1.39% 1.39% 0.00%
CPI 8.45% 11.27% 14.08% 1.41% 9.86% 12.68% 0.00%
DGO 9.72% 6.94% 13.89% 1.39% 2.78% 5.56% 1.39%
FOMC 8.00% 6.00% 4.00% 2.00% 4.00% 4.00% 14.00%
GDP 4.17% 12.50% 8.33% 0.00% 6.94% 5.56% 0.00%
IJC 5.45% 6.41% 8.33% 2.88% 4.49% 5.13% 0.00%
LI 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NFP 17.14% 5.71% 10.00% 12.86% 8.57% 5.71% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 2.82% 0.00% 2.82% 4.23% 4.23% 0.00%
PPI 2.78% 5.56% 12.50% 1.39% 6.94% 6.94% 0.00%
RSA 4.29% 7.14% 10.00% 4.29% 4.29% 8.57% 0.00%
Medium-term options
CCI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CPI 11.27% 12.68% 15.49% 7.04% 8.45% 12.68% 0.00%
DGO 8.33% 13.89% 15.28% 2.78% 5.56% 11.11% 1.39%
FOMC 6.00% 4.00% 6.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 14.00%
GDP 6.94% 9.72% 11.11% 2.78% 6.94% 9.72% 0.00%
IJC 6.09% 7.69% 9.62% 5.45% 5.13% 6.73% 0.00%
LI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NFP 7.14% 12.86% 12.86% 7.14% 8.57% 8.57% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.41% 0.00%
PPI 5.56% 8.33% 12.50% 4.17% 5.56% 9.72% 0.00%
RSA 2.86% 4.29% 7.14% 2.86% 2.86% 4.29% 0.00%
Long-term options
CCI 1.39% 1.39% 0.00% 1.39% 1.39% 1.39% 0.00%
CPI 9.86% 9.86% 15.49% 4.23% 4.23% 11.27% 0.00%
DGO 5.56% 9.72% 12.50% 6.94% 5.56% 6.94% 1.39%
FOMC 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 14.00%
GDP 8.33% 4.17% 6.94% 4.17% 6.94% 9.72% 0.00%
IJC 6.73% 6.73% 8.01% 4.81% 6.09% 7.37% 0.00%
LI 5.56% 4.17% 5.56% 6.94% 6.94% 5.56% 0.00%
NFP 11.43% 12.86% 20.00% 10.00% 7.14% 11.43% 0.00%
NHS 0.00% 1.41% 0.00% 0.00% 1.41% 0.00% 0.00%
PPI 2.78% 5.56% 4.17% 1.39% 1.39% 1.39% 0.00%
RSA 4.29% 7.14% 8.57% 4.29% 5.71% 5.71% 0.00%
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Table OA.3: Information shocks, volume, and illiquidity as jump determinants - S&P 500
index options
Short-term Medium-term Long-term
Panel A: News covariates
c -2.658 -2.607*** -2.539***
CCIt -1.217*** -601.630 -4.987***
CPIt 0.036 0.327* -0.199
DGOt 0.186 0.442*** 0.282*
FOMCt 0.465*** 0.522*** 0.274*
GDPt -0.021 0.124 -0.120
IJCt -0.013 0.026 -0.041
LIt -3.478*** -39.272 -0.156
NFPt 0.350** 0.563*** 0.721***
NHSt -0.747** -4.588*** -4.810***
PPIt -0.563* 0.157 -2.237***
RSAt -0.209 -1.389*** -0.287
Panel B: News and liquidity covariates
c -2.907*** -2.944*** -2.895***
BidSizet−1 0.000 0.001 0.001
AskSizet−1 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
sBAt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000***
CCIt -1.171** -5.128* -5.611***
CPIt 0.062 0.383** -0.294
DGOt 0.060 0.384** 0.238
FOMCt 0.407*** 0.543*** 0.178
GDPt -0.096 0.073 -0.107
IJCt -0.011 0.058 0.016
LIt -4.431** -29.16 -0.401
NFPt 0.442*** 0.647*** 0.688***
NHSt -0.571 -4.500*** -4.760***
PPIt -0.570* 0.222 -2.348***
RSAt -0.127 -1.081** -0.193
Panel C: News, volume, and liquidity covariates
c -2.821*** -2.850*** -2.611***
BidSizet−1 0.000 0.000 0.000
AskSizet−1 0.002** 0.002* 0.001
sBAt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000***
V olumet−1,t 0.000 0.000 0.000
CCIt -1.232*** -5.329*** -5.771***
CPIt -0.035 0.340** -0.076
DGOt 0.027 0.368** 0.171
FOMCt 0.400*** 0.528*** 0.160
GDPt -0.128 0.050 -0.153
IJCt 0.024 0.084 0.077
LIt -4.542** -29.295 -0.323
NFPt 0.466*** 0.616*** 0.627***
NHSt -0.628* -4.629*** -4.834***
PPIt -0.633* 0.208 -2.078***
RSAt -0.150 -0.878** -0.012
Entries report the estimation results for the logistic regression models in equations (OA.1) [Panel A],
as well as the logistic model augmented with illiquidity variables [Panel B] and trading volume [Panel
C]. The estimation is performed separately for short-, medium-, and long-term options on a sample
pooled across all delta categories. Only news-related observations are considered. ***, **, and * report
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is January 1, 2005
to December 31, 2010.
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Figure OA.1: Volatility signature plots of short-term options returns
Panel A: Short-term options
































































































































































Figure OA.1: Volatility signature plots
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Panel B: Medium-term options



































































































































































Figure OA.1: Volatility signature plots
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Panel C: Long-term options




































































































































































The figure depicts the average daily realized volatility of option returns as a function of the sampling frequency for short-, medium-, and long-term options
(Panels A, B, and C, respectively) of different delta categories. We consider the following delta categories for calls and puts (as defined in Table 1 in the
main paper): deep out-of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money (ATM).
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Figure OA.2: Broadening the definition of concurrent jumps








































































Figure OA.2: Broadening the definition of concurrent jumps
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Figure OA.2: Broadening the definition of concurrent jumps
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Focusing on each maturity and delta bucket separately the figure shows the number of jumps that
the remaining categories exhibit 10 minutes before, simultaneously, and 10 minutes after we detect a
jump in the bucket under consideration for short-, medium-, and long-term options (Panels A, B, and C,
respectively). For each maturity category, we consider deep out-of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money
(OTM), and at-the-money (ATM) calls and puts, as defined in Table 1 in the main paper.
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Figure OA.3: Distribution of option trading volume before news-related option price jumps
















































































































































































Figure OA.3: Distribution of option trading volume before news-related option price jumps
Continued from previous page

















































































































































































Figure OA.3: Distribution of option trading volume before news-related option price jumps
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The figure illustrates the frequency (in %) distribution in the two 10-minute subintervals before news-related short-, medium-, and long-term option price
jumps (Panels A, B, and C, respectively). The frequency distribution is constructed for option trading volume buckets of zero, ten or more than ten
contracts. For each maturity category, we consider deep out-of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money (ATM) calls and puts,
as defined in Table 1 in the main paper.
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Figure OA.4: Dynamics of options’ bid-ask spreads
Panel A: Short-term options






























































































































































Figure OA.4: Dynamics of options’ bid-ask spreads
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Panel B: Medium-term options




























































































































































Figure OA.4: Dynamics of options’ bid-ask spreads
Continued from previous page
Panel C: Long-term options




































































































































































The figure illustrates the time evolution of the relative bid-ask spread of short-, medium-, and long-term options (Panels A, B, and C, respectively) of
different delta categories over the non-crisis and crisis subsamples. The daily average relative-bid ask spread is depicted. The dashed line illustrates the
non-crisis/crisis split point. For each maturity category, we consider deep out-of-the-money (DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money (ATM)
calls and puts, as defined in Table 1 in the main paper.
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Figure OA.5: Distribution of co-Jumps - S&P 500 index options
Panel A: Short-term options
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The figure illustrates the distribution of co-jump events for short-, medium-, and long-term options
(Panels A, B, and C, respectively) in the case of S&P 500 options. Co-jump events are defined by the
number of concurrent jumps across different delta levels and the underlying asset. The event of only
one concurrent jump corresponds to an idiosyncratic jump in only one of the delta categories or the
underlying asset. The frequency of occurrence is reported for each possible co-jump event.
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Figure OA.6: Option bid-ask spreads around jumps - S&P 500 index options










































































































































































Figure OA.6: Option bid-ask spreads around jumps - S&P 500 index options
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Figure OA.6: Option bid-ask spreads around jumps - S&P 500 index options
Continued from previous page









































































































































































The figure shows the median relative option bid-ask spreads for a number of time subintervals around the
news related jumps (10 minutes before the jump up to 60 minutes after the jump) across the various delta
levels for short-, medium-, and long-term options (Panels A, B, and C, respectively). The jump time
corresponds to point zero in the graph. For each maturity category, we consider deep out-of-the-money
(DOTM), out-of-the-money (OTM), and at-the-money (ATM) calls and puts, as defined in Table 1 in
the main paper.
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